Cooperation and punishment mechanisms in uncertain and dynamic social networks

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Gallo, Edoardo; Riyanto, Yohanes E.; Roy, Nilanjan; Teh, Tat-How
• 署名单位: University of Cambridge; University of Cambridge; Nanyang Technological University; City University of Hong Kong; The Chinese University of Hong Kong, Shenzhen; The Chinese University of Hong Kong, Shenzhen
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2022.03.015
• 发表日期: 2022
• 页码: 75-103
• 关键词: cooperation; experiments; Prisoner?s dilemma; uncertainty; repeated games; networks

摘要

This paper examines experimentally how reputational uncertainty and the rate of change of the social environment determine cooperation. Reputational uncertainty significantly decreases cooperation, while a fast-changing social environment only causes a second order qualitative increase in cooperation. At the individual level, reputational uncertainty induces more leniency and forgiveness in imposing network punishment through the link proposal and removal processes, inhibiting the formation of cooperative clusters. However, this effect is significant only in the fast-changing environment and not in the slow-changing environment. A substitution pattern between network punishment and action punishment (retaliatory defection) explains this discrepancy across the two social environments. (c) 2022 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.