Listen before you link: Optimal monitoring rules for communication networks

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Safi, Shahir
• 署名单位: Concordia University - Canada
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2022.03.004
• 发表日期: 2022
• 页码: 230-247
• 关键词: Communication networks; ORGANIZATIONS; externalities; Consents

摘要

I consider environments where communication networks are endogenous, but monitoring rules enforce agents to ask consent from others to form new links or break their existing links. A monitoring rule consists of a number x and a collection of groups O such that each agent requires consent from x number of agents in every group she belongs to. First, I show that efficient networks can have at most one component when externalities are positive, whereas they can have multiple components when externalities are negative. Second, I find that partitioning set of agents into groups based on components of the efficient network forms smallest groups that can internalize all of externalities; therefore, they can stabilize the efficient network with minimum number of monitors. I relate this finding to the widespread adoption of small work groups with few monitors (like Quality Circles) by quality management programs to enhance communication between developers. (C) 2022 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.