Preferences vs. strategic thinking: An investigation of the causes of overcommunication

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Lafky, Jonathan; Lai, Ernest K.; Lim, Wooyoung
• 署名单位: Carleton College; Lehigh University; Hong Kong University of Science & Technology
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2022.08.002
• 发表日期: 2022
• 页码: 92-116
• 关键词: Strategic communication; Overcommunication; Truthful preferences; level-k models; Team design; laboratory experiment

摘要

The extent of information sharing in strategic communication experiments persistently exceeds what theory predicts. The literature identifies homegrown preferences and heterogeneity in strategic thinking as two major causes of overcommunication. We design an experiment that features team decisions and combines strategic and non-strategic communication to evaluate these competing explanations. We find that (a) the vast majority of strategic truthful behavior in communication of private information coincides with best responses to beliefs about opponents, (b) truthful behavior observed in non-strategic communication has limited ability to predict behavior in strategic communication, and (c) other-regarding preferences play a minimal role in influencing communication behavior in our strategic environments. Our findings favor strategic thinking as the primary explanation of overcommunication and caution that truthful preferences documented in non-strategic settings may not readily explain strategic truthful behavior.(c) 2022 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.