Leading to efficient coordination: Individual traits, beliefs and choices in the minimum effort game

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Feri, Francesco; Gantner, Anita; Moffatt, Peter G.; Erharter, Dominik
• 署名单位: University of London; Royal Holloway University London; University of Innsbruck; University of East Anglia
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2022.10.003
• 发表日期: 2022
• 页码: 403-427
• 关键词: coordination; learning in games; Heterogeneity; experiments

摘要

We consider data from an experiment on the minimum-effort game, repeated over many periods. In each play of the game, each player's belief about the minimum-effort of other players in the group is elicited, in addition to the player's chosen effort level. We find that many agents choose effort levels systematically exceeding their beliefs of others' effort levels. We explain this in terms of such subjects taking the role of leader in an attempt to pull the group towards more efficient outcomes. We find that the propensity for leaders to emerge depends on individual traits such as trustfulness and cognitive ability. Furthermore, moving to a superior equilibrium is more likely under certain design features such as conditions relating to the cost of effort and the amount of information available to players. (c) 2022 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Inc. This is an open access article under the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).