Repeated implementation
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
Kalai, E; Ledyard, JO
署名单位：
Northwestern University; California Institute of Technology
刊物名称：
JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
ISSN/ISSBN：
0022-0531
DOI：
10.1006/jeth.1997.2459
发表日期：
1998
页码：
308-317
关键词：
摘要：
In the traditional static implementation literature it is often impossible for implementors to enforce their optimal outcomes. And when restricting the choice to dominant-strategy implementation, only the dictatorial choices of one of the participants are implementable. Repeated implementation problems are drastically different. This paper provides a strong implementation folk theorem for patient implementers, every outcome function they care about is dominant-strategy implementable. journal cf Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C7, D7. (C) 1998 Academic Press.
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