Public information, private information, and the multiplicity of equilibria in coordination games

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Hellwig, C
• 署名单位: University of California System; University of California Los Angeles
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1006/jeth.2002.2947
• 发表日期: 2002
• 页码: 191-222
• 关键词: Global games; equilibrium convergence; common knowledge; higher-order beliefs

摘要

I study coordination games with incomplete public and private information and relate equilibrium convergence to convergence of higher-order beliefs. As the players' signals become more and more precise, the equilibrium manifold converges to the correspondence of common knowledge equilibria, whenever the variance of the public signal converges to 0 at a rate faster than one half the rate of convergence of the variance of private signals. The same condition also determines the convergence of common p-belief to common knowledge, which leads to a simple intuition for its origin and an immediate generalization of the former results about equilibrium convergence. (C) 2002 Elsevier Science (USA).