Subjective uncertainty over behavior strategies: A correction

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Dekel, E; Fudenberg, D; Levine, DK
• 署名单位: Northwestern University; Tel Aviv University; Harvard University; University of California System; University of California Los Angeles
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1006/jeth.2001.2866
• 发表日期: 2002
• 页码: 473-478
• 关键词: extensive-form games; behavior strategies; subjective uncertainty; rationalizability; self-confirming equilibrium

摘要

In order to model the subjective uncertainty of a player over the behavior strategies of an opponent, one must consider the player's beliefs about the opponent's play at information sets that the player thinks have probability zero. This corregendum uses trembles to provide a definition of the convex bull of a set of behavior strategies. This corrects a definition we gave in [E. Dekel, D. Fudenberg, and D. K. Levine, 1999, J. Econ. Theory 89, 165-185], which led to two of the solution concepts we defined there not having the properties we intended. (C) 2002 Elsevier Science (USA).