Subscription mechanisms for network formation

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Mutuswami, S; Winter, E
• 署名单位: University of Essex; European University Institute; Hebrew University of Jerusalem
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1006/jeth.2001.2920
• 发表日期: 2002
• 页码: 242-264
• 关键词: NETWORKS; mechanism design; Shapley value

摘要

We analyze a model of network formation where the costs of link formation are publicly known but individual benefits are not known to the social planner. The objective is to design a simple mechanism ensuring efficiency, budget balance, and equity. We propose two mechanisms towards this end; the first ensures efficiency and budget balance but not equity. The second mechanism corrects the asymmetry in payoffs through a two-stage variant of the first mechanism. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C71, C72, D20. (C) 2002 Elsevier Science (USA).