A simple selling and buying procedure

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Pérez-Castrillo, D; Sotomayor, M
• 署名单位: Autonomous University of Barcelona; Autonomous University of Barcelona
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1006/jeth.2000.2783
• 发表日期: 2002
• 页码: 461-474
• 关键词: matching model; assignment model; mechanism; implementation

摘要

For the assignment game, we analyze the following mechanism. Sellers, simultaneously, fix their prices first. Then buyers, sequentially, decide which object to buy. Also, each buyer may report his or her indifferences (along with the previous buyers' indifferences) to the following buyer. The first phase determines the potential prices, while the second phase determines the actual matching. Reporting truthfully the indifferences is always a dominant strategy for the buyers. Moreover, when buyers state their true indifferences, the subgame perfect equilibria outcomes of the mechanism correspond to the maximum equilibrium price vector together with optimal matchings. (C) 2001 Elsevier Science (USA).