The package assignment model

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Bikhchandani, S; Ostroy, JM
• 署名单位: University of California System; University of California Los Angeles; University of California System; University of California Los Angeles
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1006/jeth.2001.2957
• 发表日期: 2002
• 页码: 377-406
• 关键词: assignment model; Walrasian equilibrium; Non-linear pricing; linear programming; the core; Vickrey payments; multi-object auctions

摘要

We study assignment problems where individuals trade packages consisting of several, rather than single, objects. Although buyers' reservations values are nonadditive, efficient assignments can be formulated as a linear programming problem in which the pricing functions expressing duality may be non-linear in the objects constituting the packages. The interconnections among the linear programming formulation, Walrasian equilibrium, and the core are established. In the single seller (auction) version, a necessary and sufficient condition is given for the Vickrey payoff point to be implementable by a pricing equilibrium. (C) 2002 Elsevier Science (USA).