Evolution in games with endogenous mistake probabilities

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: van Damme, E; Weibull, JW
• 署名单位: Tilburg University; Boston University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1006/jeth.2001.2941
• 发表日期: 2002
• 页码: 296-315
• 关键词: evolution; mutation rates; Mistakes

摘要

J. Bergin and B. Lipman (Econometrica 64 (1996), 943-956) show that the selection effect from the random mutations in the adaptive population dynamics in M. Kandori, G. Mailath, and R. Rob (Econometrica 61 (1993), 29-56) and P. Young (Econometrica 61 (1993), 57-84) is due to restrictions on how these mutation rates vary across population states. We here model mutation rates as endogenously determined mistake probabilities, by assuming that players with some effort can control the probability of implementing the intended strategy. This is shown to corroborate the results in Kandori-Mailath-Rob (1993) and, under certain regularity conditions, those in Young (1993). Journal of Economic Literature Classification Number: C72. (C) 2002 Elsevier Science (USA).