-
作者：Balder, EJ
作者单位：Utrecht University
摘要：For games with a measure space of players a tandem pair, consisting of a mixed and a pure Cournot-Nash equilibrium existence result, is presented. Their generality causes them to be completely mutually equivalent. This provides a unifying pair of Cournot-Nash existence results that goes considerably beyond the central result of E. J. Balder (1995, Int. J. Game Theory 24, 79-94, Theorem 2.1). The versatility of this pair is demonstrated by the following new applications: (i) unification and gen...
-
作者：Kübler, F; Chiappori, PA; Ekeland, I; Polemarchakis, HM
作者单位：Stanford University; University of Chicago; Universite PSL; Universite Paris-Dauphine; Universite PSL; Universite Paris-Dauphine; Brown University; Universite Catholique Louvain
摘要：The competitive equilibrium correspondence, which associates equilibrium prices of commodities and assets with allocations of endowments, identifies the preferences and beliefs of individuals under uncertainty; this is the case even if the asset market is incomplete. (C) 2001 Elsevier Science.
-
作者：Ewerhart, C
作者单位：University of Mannheim
摘要：We prove that any strictly competitive perfect-information two-person game with n outcomes is solvable in n-1 steps of elimination of weakly dominated strategies-regardless of the length of the game tree. The given bound is shown to be tight using a variant of Rosenthal's centipede game. (C) 2002 Elsevier Science (USA).
-
作者：Baliga, S; Morris, S
作者单位：Northwestern University; Yale University
摘要：We analyze the role of cheap-talk in two player games with one-sided incomplete information. We identify conditions under which (1) players can fully communicate and coordinate on efficient Nash equilibria of the underlying complete information game; and (2) players cannot communicate so cheap-talk does not alter the equilibrium set of the Bayesian game. We present examples that illustrate several issues that arise when there is two-sided incomplete information. (C) 2001 Elsevier Science (USA).
-
作者：Cabral, LMB
作者单位：New York University
摘要：I uncover a new force towards increasing dominance (the property whereby, in dynamic games, the leader tends to increase his or her lead in expected terms). The new effect results from the strategic choice of covariance in races. I assume that players must choose not the amount of resources to spend but how to allocate those resources. I show that. in equilibrium, the laggard chooses a less promising path, in effect trading off lower expected value for lower correlation with respect to the lea...
-
作者：Aoyagi, M
作者单位：University of Osaka; Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); University of Pittsburgh
摘要：This paper studies collusion in repeated Bertrand oligopoly when stochastic demand levels for the product of each firm are their private information and are positively correlated. It derives general sufficient conditions for efficient collusion through communication and a simple grim-trigger strategy This analyses is then applied to a model where the demand signal has multiple random components which respond differently to price deviations. In this model, it is shown that the above sufficient ...
-
作者：Kandori, M
作者单位：University of Tokyo
摘要：We present a brief overview of recent developments in discounted: repeated games with (imperfect) private monitoring. The literature explores the possibility of cooperation in a long-term relationship, where each agent receives imperfect private information about the opponents' actions. Although this class of games admits a wide range of applications such as collusion under secret price-cutting, exchange of goods with uncertain quality, and observation errors, it has fairly complex mathematica...
-
作者：Manzini, P; Mariotti, M
作者单位：University of London; Queen Mary University London; University of Exeter
摘要：A seemingly mild assumption of the standard alternating offers bargaining model under risk is that the breakdown event is not strictly worse than the worst agreement. When this assumption is relaxed the structure of the equilibrium set of agreements changes in an interesting way. We analyse the effect of disagreement on equilibrium, and relate our result to a class of outside option models. (C) 2002 Elsevier Science (USA).
-
作者：Eichberger, J; Kelsey, D
作者单位：University of Birmingham; Ruprecht Karls University Heidelberg
摘要：We examine the effect of ambiguity in symmetric games with aggregate externalities. We find that ambiguity will increase/decrease the equilibrium strategy in games with strategic complements/substitutes and positive externalities. These effects are reversed in games with negative externalities. We consider some economic applications of these results to Cournot oligopoly, bargaining, macroeconomic coordination, and voluntary donations to a public good. In particular we show that ambiguity may r...
-
作者：Ely, JC; Välimäki, J
作者单位：Northwestern University; University of Southampton
摘要：We prove the Folk theorem for the Prisoner's dilemma using strategies that are robust to private monitoring. From this follows a limit folk theorem: when players are patient and monitoring is sufficiently accurate, (but private and possibly independent) any feasible individually rational payoff can be obtained in sequential equilibrium. The strategies used can be implemented by finite (randomizing) automata. (C) 2001 Elsevier Science.
