Iterated weak dominance in strictly competitive games of perfect information
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
Ewerhart, C
署名单位：
University of Mannheim
刊物名称：
JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
ISSN/ISSBN：
0022-0531
DOI：
10.1006/jeth.2001.2958
发表日期：
2002
页码：
474-482
关键词：
摘要：
We prove that any strictly competitive perfect-information two-person game with n outcomes is solvable in n-1 steps of elimination of weakly dominated strategies-regardless of the length of the game tree. The given bound is shown to be tight using a variant of Rosenthal's centipede game. (C) 2002 Elsevier Science (USA).