A robust folk theorem for the prisoner's dilemma
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
Ely, JC; Välimäki, J
署名单位：
Northwestern University; University of Southampton
刊物名称：
JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
ISSN/ISSBN：
0022-0531
DOI：
10.1006/jeth.2000.2774
发表日期：
2002
页码：
84-105
关键词：
摘要：
We prove the Folk theorem for the Prisoner's dilemma using strategies that are robust to private monitoring. From this follows a limit folk theorem: when players are patient and monitoring is sufficiently accurate, (but private and possibly independent) any feasible individually rational payoff can be obtained in sequential equilibrium. The strategies used can be implemented by finite (randomizing) automata. (C) 2001 Elsevier Science.