A unifying pair of Cournot-Nash equilibrium existence results

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Balder, EJ
• 署名单位: Utrecht University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1006/jeth.2001.2849
• 发表日期: 2002
• 页码: 437-470
• 关键词: mixed Cournot-Nash equilibrium; pure Cournot-Nash equilibrium; equilibrium distribution; Bayesian Nash equilibrium; differential information

摘要

For games with a measure space of players a tandem pair, consisting of a mixed and a pure Cournot-Nash equilibrium existence result, is presented. Their generality causes them to be completely mutually equivalent. This provides a unifying pair of Cournot-Nash existence results that goes considerably beyond the central result of E. J. Balder (1995, Int. J. Game Theory 24, 79-94, Theorem 2.1). The versatility of this pair is demonstrated by the following new applications: (i) unification and generalization of the two equilibrium distribution existence results by K. P. Rath (1996, J. Math. Econ. 26, 305-324) for anonymous games, (ii) generalization of the equilibrium existence result of T. Kim and N. C. Yannelis (1997, J. Econ. Theory 77, 330-353) for Bayesian differential information games, (iii) inclusion of the Bayesian Nash equilibrium existence results of P. R. Milgrom and R. J. Weber (1985, Math. Oper. Res. 10, 619-632) and E. J. Balder (1988, Math. Operations Res. 13, 265-276) for games with private information in the sense of J. C. Harsanyi (1967, Manage. Sci. 14, 159-182). (C) 2002 Elsevier Science.