-
作者：Gollier, C
作者单位：Universite de Toulouse
摘要：We consider an economy a la Lucas (1978, Econometrica 46, 1429-1446) with a risk-averse representative agent. The exogenous growth rate of the economy follows a random walk. We characterize the set of utility functions for which it is efficient to discount more distant cash flows at a lower rate. The benchmark result is that, when the growth rate is almost surely nonnegative, the yield curve is decreasing if and only if relative risk aversion is decreasing with wealth. Relaxing the assumption ...
-
作者：Garratt, R; Keister, T
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Santa Barbara; Instituto Tecnologico Autonomo de Mexico
摘要：In nonconvex environments, a sunspot equilibrium can sometimes be destroyed by the introduction of new extrinsic information. We provide a simple test for determining whether or not a particular equilibrium survives, or is robust to, all possible refinements of the state space. We use this test to provide a characterization of the set of robust sunspot-equilibrium allocations of a given economy; it is equivalent to the set of equilibrium allocations of the associated lottery economy. (C) 2002 ...
-
作者：Prescott, EC; Shell, K
作者单位：University of Minnesota System; University of Minnesota Twin Cities; Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - Minneapolis; Cornell University
摘要：This introduces the symposium on sunspots and lotteries. Two stochastic general-equilibrium concepts, sunspot equilibrium (SE) and lottery equilibrium (LE), are compared. It is shown that, for some general, pure-exchange economies which allow for consumption nonconvexities or moral hazards, the set of LE allocations is equivalent to the set of SE allocations provided that the randomizing device can generate events of any probability. (C) 2002 Elsevier Science (USA).
-
作者：Boldrin, M; Levine, DK
作者单位：University of Minnesota System; University of Minnesota Twin Cities; University of California System; University of California Los Angeles
摘要：It has been argued that concave models exhibit less endogencity of growth than models with increasing returns to scale. Here we study a simple model of factor saving technological improvement in a concave framework. Capital ran be used either to reproduce itself, or, at some additional cost, to produce a higher quality of capital, which requires less labor input. If better quality capital can be produced quickly, we get a model of exogenous balanced growth as a special case of ours. If, howeve...
-
作者：Pérez-Castrillo, D; Sotomayor, M
作者单位：Autonomous University of Barcelona; Autonomous University of Barcelona
摘要：For the assignment game, we analyze the following mechanism. Sellers, simultaneously, fix their prices first. Then buyers, sequentially, decide which object to buy. Also, each buyer may report his or her indifferences (along with the previous buyers' indifferences) to the following buyer. The first phase determines the potential prices, while the second phase determines the actual matching. Reporting truthfully the indifferences is always a dominant strategy for the buyers. Moreover, when buye...
-
作者：Bikhchandani, S; Ostroy, JM
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Los Angeles; University of California System; University of California Los Angeles
摘要：We study assignment problems where individuals trade packages consisting of several, rather than single, objects. Although buyers' reservations values are nonadditive, efficient assignments can be formulated as a linear programming problem in which the pricing functions expressing duality may be non-linear in the objects constituting the packages. The interconnections among the linear programming formulation, Walrasian equilibrium, and the core are established. In the single seller (auction) v...
-
作者：Hauk, E; Saez-Marti, M
作者单位：Pompeu Fabra University; Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IFN)
摘要：We provide a cultural explanation to the phenomenon of corruption in the framework of an overlapping generations model with intergenerational transmission of values. We show that the economy has two steady states with different levels of corruption. The driving force in the equilibrium selection process is the education effort exerted by parents which depends on the distribution of ethics in the population and on expectations about future policies. We propose some policy interventions which vi...
-
作者：Hellwig, C
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Los Angeles
摘要：I study coordination games with incomplete public and private information and relate equilibrium convergence to convergence of higher-order beliefs. As the players' signals become more and more precise, the equilibrium manifold converges to the correspondence of common knowledge equilibria, whenever the variance of the public signal converges to 0 at a rate faster than one half the rate of convergence of the variance of private signals. The same condition also determines the convergence of com...
-
作者：Banks, JS; Duggan, J; Le Breton, M
作者单位：California Institute of Technology; University of Rochester; University of Rochester
摘要：We prove that the support of mixed strategy equilibria of two-player, symmetric, zero-sum games lies in the uncovered set, a concept originating in the theory of tournaments. and the spatial theory of politics. We allow for uncountably infinite strategy spaces, and as a special case. we obtain a long-standing claim to the same effect. due to R. McKelvey (Amer. J. Polit. Sci. 30 (1986), 283-314). in the political science literature. Further. we prove the nonemptiness of the uncovered set under ...
-
作者：Mutuswami, S; Winter, E
作者单位：University of Essex; European University Institute; Hebrew University of Jerusalem
摘要：We analyze a model of network formation where the costs of link formation are publicly known but individual benefits are not known to the social planner. The objective is to design a simple mechanism ensuring efficiency, budget balance, and equity. We propose two mechanisms towards this end; the first ensures efficiency and budget balance but not equity. The second mechanism corrects the asymmetry in payoffs through a two-stage variant of the first mechanism. Journal of Economic Literature Cla...
