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作者：Aiyagari, SR; Greenwood, J; Seshadri, A
作者单位：University of Rochester; University of Wisconsin System; University of Wisconsin Madison
摘要：Many would say that children are society's most precious resource. So, how should we invest in them? To gain insight into this question, a dynamic general equilibrium model is developed where children differ by ability. Parents invest time and money in their offspring, depending on their altruism. This allows their children to grow up as more productive adults. First, the efficient allocation is characterized, Next, this is compared with the outcome that arises when Financial markets are incom...
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作者：Schummer, J; Vohra, RV
作者单位：Northwestern University
摘要：We consider rules that choose a location on a graph (e.g. a road network) based on agents' single-peaked preferences. First, we characterize the class of strategy-proof onto rules when the graph is a tree. Such a rule is based on a collection of generalized median voter rules (Moulin, 1980) satisfying a consistency condition. Second, we characterize such rules for graphs containing cycles. We show that while such a rule is not necessarily dictatorial, the existence of a cycle grants some agent...
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作者：Prescott, ES; Townsend, RM
作者单位：University of Chicago; Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - Richmond; Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - Chicago
摘要：This paper studies collective economic organizations that share risk and mitigate moral hazard and compares them with relative performance contracts. Information-constrained optimal distributions of organizations and contracts are shown to be functions of the underlying primitives, in particular, the distribution of Pareto weights, and hence degree of inequality. Internal inequality of a potential, local group is a force for collective organization. That is, multi-agent organizations exist in ...
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作者：Bandyopadhyay, T; Dasgupta, I; Pattanaik, PK
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Riverside; University of Nottingham
摘要：We address the problem of aggregating demand across a group of consumers, who are identical in terms of wealth and face identical price vectors, but vary in their chosen consumption bundles. We show that, when a stochastic demand function is constructed to aggregate a number of deterministic demand functions, satisfaction of the weak axiom of stochastic revealed preference by this stochastic demand function is weaker than the restriction that every underlying deterministic demand function sati...
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作者：Anwar, AW
作者单位：University of Edinburgh
摘要：Recent stochastic evolutionary models have shown that the most likely outcome when the probability of a mutation is sufficiently small is coordination on the risk-dominant strategy rather than on the payoff-dominant one. This paper looks at the consequences of player movement between locations when there are constraints which limit the number of agents who can reside at each location. If the constraints are tight then the risk-dominance result continues to hold. However, we show that when suff...
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作者：Bergemann, D; Välimäki, J
作者单位：Yale University; University of Southampton
摘要：This paper analyzes the entry of new products into vertically differentiated markets where an entrant and an incumbent compete in quantities. The value of the new product is initially uncertain and new information is generated through purchases in the market. We derive the (unique) Markov perfect equilibrium of the infinite horizon game under the strong long run average payoff criterion. The qualitative features of the optimal entry strategy are shown to depend exclusively on the relative rank...
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作者：Gajdos, T
摘要：The (generalized) Gini indices rely on the social welfare function of a decision maker who behaves in accordance with Yaari's model, with a function f that transforms frequencies. This SWF can also be represented as the weighted sum of the welfare of all the possible coalitions in the society, where the welfare of a coalition is defined as the income of the worst-off member of that coalition. We provide a set of axioms (Ak) and prove that the three following statements are equivalent: (i) the ...
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作者：Ozdenoren, E
作者单位：University of Michigan System; University of Michigan
摘要：We define an opportunity act as a mapping from an exogenously given objective state space to a set of lotteries over prizes. and consider preferences over opportunity acts, We allow the preferences to be possibly uncertainty averse. Our main theorem provides an axiomatization of the maxmin expected utility model. In the theorem we construct subjective states to complete the objective state space. As in E. Dekel et al. (Econometrica, in press), we obtain a unique subjective state space. We also...
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作者：Hauk, E; Hurkens, S
作者单位：Pompeu Fabra University
摘要：We analyze which normal form solution concepts capture the notion of forward induction, as defined by E. van Damme (1989, J. Econ. Theory 48, 476-496) in the class of generic two player normal form games preceded by an outside option. We find that none of the known strategic stability concepts (including Mertens stable sets and hyperstable sets) capture this form of forward induction. On the other hand, we show that the evolutionary concept of EES set (J. Swinkels, 1992, J. Econ. Theory 57, 30...
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作者：Katok, E; Sefton, M; Yavas, A
作者单位：Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); Pennsylvania State University; Pennsylvania State University - University Park; University of Nottingham
摘要：We report experimental results on the relative performance of simultaneous and sequential versions of the Abreu-Matsushima mechanism. Under the simultaneous version, subjects typically use undominated strategies, but apply only a limited number of iterations of dominance. Consequently the unique strategy surviving iterative elimination of strictly dominated strategies is rarely observed. Under the sequential version, subjects also typically use undominated strategies, but apply only a limited ...
