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作者：Kehoe, TJ; Levine, DK; Prescott, EC
作者单位：University of Minnesota System; University of Minnesota Twin Cities; Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - Minneapolis; University of California System; University of California Los Angeles
摘要：We study a prototypical class of exchange economics with private information and indivisibilities. We establish an equivalence between lottery equilibria and sunspot equilibria and show that the welfare and existence theorems hold. To establish these results, we introduce the concept of the stand-in consumer economy, which is a standard, convex, finite consumer, finite good, pure exchange economy. With decreasing absolute risk aversion and no indivisibilities, we prove that no lotteries are ac...
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作者：Manelli, AM
作者单位：Arizona State University; Arizona State University-Tempe
摘要：It is well known that a stage game with infinite choice-sets, unless it contains a public coordination-de ice in each stage, may have no subgame perfect equilibria. We show that if a game with public coordination-de ices has a subgame perfect equilibrium in which two players in each stage use non-atomic strategies. then the game without coordination devices also has a subgame perfect equilibrium. (C) 2001 Elsevier Science.
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作者：Ambec, S; Sprumont, Y
作者单位：Communaute Universite Grenoble Alpes; Universite Grenoble Alpes (UGA); INRAE; University of Salerno; Universite de Montreal; Universite de Montreal
摘要：A group of agents located along a river have quasi-linear preferences over water and money. We ask how the water should be allocated and what money transfers should be performed. The core lower bounds require that no coalition should get less than the welfare it could achieve by using the water it controls. The aspiration upper bounds demand that no coalition enjoy a welfare higher than what it could achieve in the absence of the remaining agents. Exactly one welfare distribution satisfies the...
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作者：Krusell, P; Kurusçu, B; Smith, AA Jr
作者单位：University of Rochester; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK; Carnegie Mellon University
摘要：We consider a representative-agent equilibrium model where the consumer has quasi-geometric discounting and cannot commit to future actions. We restrict attention to a parametric class for preferences and technology and solve for time-consistent competitive equilibria globally and explicitly. We then characterize the welfare properties of competitive equilibria and compare them to that of a planning problem. The planner is a consumer representative who, without commitment but in a time-consist...
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作者：Azariadis, C; Galasso, V
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Los Angeles; Universidad Carlos III de Madrid
摘要：We study the impact of fiscal constitutions on intergenerational transfers in an overlapping generation model with linear technology. Transfers represent outcomes of a voting game among selfish agents. Policies are decided one period at a time. Majoritarian systems, which accord voters maximum fiscal discretion, sustain all individually rational allocations, including dynamically inefficient ones. Constitutional rules, which give minorities veto power over fiscal policy changes proposed by the...
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作者：Chateauneuf, A; Gajdos, T; Wilthien, PH
作者单位：heSam Universite; Universite Pantheon-Sorbonne; ESSEC Business School
摘要：We reconsider the principles of diminishing transfer and dual diminishing transfer. It appears that if a Rank Dependent Expected Utility (RDEU) maximizer respects the principle of diminishing (resp. dual diminishing) transfer, then he or she behaves in accordance with the Expected Utility model (resp, Yaari's dual model). This leads us to define the principle of strong diminishing transfer, which is a combination of the principles of diminishing and dual diminishing transfer. We give necessary...
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作者：Compte, O
作者单位：Institut Polytechnique de Paris; Ecole des Ponts ParisTech
摘要：I consider a repeated prisoners' dilemma where in each period, each player receives an imperfect private signal about his opponent's current action. I show,that when players are patient enough, any equilibrium where players use trigger strategies (i.e., do not revert to cooperation once they have started defecting) yields players a value arbitrarily close to the mutual minimax. I also examine the robustness of the result to perturbations of the game. (C) 2002 Elsevier Science.
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作者：Chade, H; Schlee, EE
作者单位：Arizona State University; Arizona State University-Tempe
摘要：This paper revisits the well-known result of R. Radner and J. Stiglitz (1984, in Bayesian Models of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Amsterdam) which shows that, under certain conditions, the value of information exhibits increasing marginal returns over some range. Their result assumes that both the number of states and the number of signal realizations are finite, assumptions which preclude most analyses of optimal information acquisition. We provide sufficient conditions that yield this nonconcav...
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作者：Anbarci, N; Skaperdas, S; Syropoulos, C
作者单位：State University System of Florida; Florida International University; University of California System; University of California Irvine
摘要：In many economic environments agents make costly and irreversible investments (in guns) that may enhance their respective threat payoffs but also shrink the utility possibilities set. In such settings, with variable threats and a variable utility possibilities set, it becomes possible to rank different bargaining solutions in terms of efficiency. We compare bargaining solutions within a class in which the influence of the threat point on the bargaining outcome varies across solutions. Under sy...
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作者：Kovalenkov, A
作者单位：University of North Carolina; University of North Carolina Chapel Hill
摘要：This note provides an indirect analysis of the incentive properties of the Walrasian mechanism. It presents mechanisms under which truth-telling is a dominant strategy in Finite exchange economics (in contrast to the Walrasian mechanism) and whose outcomes (generically) approximate Walrasian ones for large economics. These mechanisms provide new insights on the well-know trade-off between efficiency and incentive compatibility in finite economics. (C) 2001 Elsevier Science (USA).
