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作者：Benoît, JP
作者单位：New York University
摘要：A Gibbard-Satterthwaite type theorem is established for random decision rules and rules that permit ties. The rules use full information on how individuals rank lotteries and sets of outcomes. The theorem allows restrictions on the domain of rankings. (C) 2001 Elsevier Science.
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作者：Ghirardato, P; Marinacci, M
作者单位：California Institute of Technology; University of Turin
摘要：The theory of subjective expected utility has been recently extended to allow ambiguity to matter for choice. We propose a notion of absolute ambiguity aversion by building on a notion of comparative ambiguity aversion. We characterize it for a preference model which encompasses some of the most popular models in the literature. We next build on these ideas to provide a definition of unambiguous act and event and show the characterization of the latter. As an illustration, we consider the clas...
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作者：Halpern, JY
作者单位：Cornell University
摘要：Logical characterizations of the common prior assumption (CPA) are investigated. Two approaches are considered. The first is called frame distinguishability, and is similar in spirit to the approaches considered in the economics literature. Results similar to those obtained in the economics literature are proved here as well, namely, that we can distinguish finite spaces that satisfy the CPA from those that do not in terms of disagreements in expectation. However, it is shown that, for the lan...
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作者：Haimanko, O
作者单位：Ben-Gurion University of the Negev
摘要：We show that a single-valued solution of nonatomic finite-type market games (or perfectly competitive TU economies underling them) is uniquely determined as the Mertens value by four plausible value-related axioms. Since the Mertens value is always in the core of an economy, this result provides an axiomatization of a core-selection (or, alternatively, a competitive payoff selection). (C) 2001 Elsevier Science (USA).
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作者：Ghiglino, C; Sorger, G
作者单位：University of London; Queen Mary University London
摘要：We consider a one-sector growth model in continuous time with a production externality and endogenous labor supply. There is a continuum of households who have identical preferences but differ with respect to their initial wealth. We show that there exist economics such that an indeterminate steady state exists for some wealth distribution but not for others. A second result is that a redistribution of wealth may drive the economy from a steady state with strictly positive output to a poverty ...
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作者：Nishimura, K; Shimomura, K
作者单位：Kyoto University; Kobe University
摘要：This paper introduces sector-specific externalities in the Heckscher Ohlin two-country dynamic general equilibrium model to show that indeterminacy of the equilibrium path in the world market can occur. Under certain conditions in terms of factor intensities, there are multiple equilibrium paths from the same initial distribution of capital in the world market, and the distribution of capital in the limit differs among equilibrium paths. One equilibrium path converges to a long-run equilibrium...
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作者：Ortigueira, S; Santos, MS
作者单位：Cornell University; Arizona State University; Arizona State University-Tempe
摘要：In this paper we are concerned with the equilibrium dynamics of a two-sector model of endogenous growth with distortionary taxes. We show that for certain parameters values and tax schemes every equilibrium orbit-except the steady state solution-is non-interior; i.e., there are times in which one of the sectors is inactive. This analysis confirms that in multisector models the set of easily checkable, universal conditions that can guarantee the interiority of equilibrium solutions is rather li...
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作者：Compte, O
作者单位：Institut Polytechnique de Paris; Ecole des Ponts ParisTech
摘要：This paper examines a dynamic game in which each player only observes a private and imperfect signal on the actions played. Our main result is that in a repeated prisoner's dilemma where defections are irreversible (at least for a long enough period of time), patient enough players may achieve almost efficient outcomes. Dealing with models of imperfect private monitoring is difficult because (i) continuation games are games or incomplete information, hence they do not have the same structure a...
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作者：Anthonisen, N
作者单位：Mount Allison University
摘要：This paper shows that experimentation can have the effect of inducing outcomes that are far from Nash in a learning model similar to that studied by D. Fudenberg and D. K. Levine (1993, Econometrica 61, 547-573). The game under consideration is a version of a finitely repeated prisoner's dilemma, and the average length of players' lifetimes is arbitrarily large, but fixed. If the number of stages in the prisoner's dilemma is sufficiently large, then experimentation induces cooperation within t...
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作者：Blume, LE; Easley, D
作者单位：Cornell University
摘要：We ask if natural selection in markets favors profit-maximizing firms and, if so, is there a difference between the predictions of models which assume all firms are profit maximizers and the predictions of models which explicitly take account of population dynamics in the market. We show that market selection favors profit maximizing firms, but we also show that the long-run behavior of evolutionary market models is nonetheless not consistent with equilibrium models based on the profit-maximiz...
