Collusion in dynamic Bertrand oligopoly with correlated private signals and communication

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Aoyagi, M
• 署名单位: University of Osaka; Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); University of Pittsburgh
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1006/jeth.2000.2711
• 发表日期: 2002
• 页码: 229-248
• 关键词: Private monitoring; correlation; Repeated game; secret price cutting

摘要

This paper studies collusion in repeated Bertrand oligopoly when stochastic demand levels for the product of each firm are their private information and are positively correlated. It derives general sufficient conditions for efficient collusion through communication and a simple grim-trigger strategy This analyses is then applied to a model where the demand signal has multiple random components which respond differently to price deviations. In this model, it is shown that the above sufficient conditions hold if idiosyncratic noise terms are sufficiently small. (C) 2001 Elsevier Science.