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作者：Piccione, M
作者单位：University of London; London School Economics & Political Science
摘要：In this paper, I study a repeated Prisoner's Dilemma game in which monitoring is private and imperfect. A partial folk theorem is proved for the case of almost perfect monitoring. (C) 2001 Elsevier Science.
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作者：Ehlers, L
作者单位：Universite de Montreal; Universite de Montreal
摘要：We consider house allocation without endowments. We show that there is a unique maximal domain including all strict preference on which efficancy and coalitional strategygy-proofness are compatible, A preferenc relation belongs to the unique maximal domain if it is a strict descending ranking of houses to a certain house and indifference holds over it and the remaining house. We also show that on this domain mixed dictator-pairwise-exchange rules are the only rules satisfying efficiency and co...
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作者：Ehlers, L; Peters, H; Storcken, T
作者单位：Maastricht University; Universite de Montreal
摘要：Collective decision problems are considered with a finite number of agents who have single-peaked preferences oil the real line. A probabilistic decision scheme assigns a probability distribution over the real line to every profile of reported preferences. The main result of the paper is a characterisation of the class of unanimous and strategy-proof probabilistic schemes with the aid of fixed probability distributions that play a role similar to that of the phantom voters in H. Moulin (Public...
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作者：Erosa, A; Gervais, M
作者单位：Autonomous University of Barcelona; Queens University - Canada; Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - Richmond; Western University (University of Western Ontario)
摘要：We use a very standard life-cycle growth model, in which individuals have a labor-leisure choice in each period of their lives, to prove that an optimizing government will almost always find it optimal to tax or subsidize interest income, The intuition for our result is straightforward. In a life-cycle model the individual's optimal consumption-work plan is almost never constant and an optimizing government almost always taxes consumption goods and labor earnings at different rates over an ind...
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作者：Berliant, M; Peng, SK; Wang, P
作者单位：Washington University (WUSTL); Academia Sinica - Taiwan; Vanderbilt University
摘要：We formally explore Jacobs' idea that uncompensated knowledge spillovers are crucial for agglomeration by modeling location-dependent interfirm production externalities in a general-equilibrium linear-city framework. Good and factor allocation, firms' and households' locational choice, and wages and land rents are all endogenously determined. The unique equilibrium urban configuration may be concentrated (with monocentric firm locations), dispersed (with completely mixed firm/household locatio...
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作者：Boucekkine, R; de la Croix, D; Licandro, O
作者单位：Universite Catholique Louvain; Fonds de la Recherche Scientifique - FNRS; Universite Catholique Louvain; European University Institute; European University Institute
摘要：We study how economic growth is affected by demographics in an OLG model with a realistic survival law. Individuals optimally chose the dates at which they leave school to work and at which they retire. Endogenous growth arises thanks to the accumulation of generation-specific human capital. Favorable shifts in the survival probabilities induce longer schooling and later retirement but have an ambiguous effect on per-capita growth, The long-term relationship between fertility and per-capita gr...
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作者：Cooper, R; Corbae, D
作者单位：Boston University; University of Texas System; University of Texas Austin
摘要：We analyze financial collapses, such as the one that occurred during the U.S. Great Depression, from the perspective of a monetary model with multiple equilibria. The multiplicity arises from the presence of a strategic complementarity due to increasing returns to scale in the intermediation process. Intermediaries provide the link between savers and firms who require working capital for production. Fluctuations in the intermediation process are driven by variations in the confidence agents pl...
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作者：Ishiguro, S
作者单位：Ritsumeikan University
摘要：This paper investigates the optimal contract design in a principal agent model where verification of an agent's action is endogenously determined through strategic interactions between contracting parties. We derive a necessary and sufficient condition for the first best outcome to be implemented as an equilibrium, The equilibrium has the following features (i) The action level that the agent chooses is not verified even if it is possible. (ii) Nevertheless. the first best can be attained by m...
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作者：Martinelli, C
作者单位：Instituto Tecnologico Autonomo de Mexico; Instituto Tecnologico Autonomo de Mexico
摘要：This paper derives a necessary condition for unanimous voting to converge to the perfect information outcome when voters are only imperfectly informed about the alternatives. Under some continuity assumptions. the condition is also sufficient for the existence of a sequence of equilibria that exhibits convergence, The requirement is equivalent to that found by Milgrom [1979, Econometrica 47, 679 688] for information aggregation in single-prize auctions. An example illustrates that convergence ...
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作者：Gauthier, S
作者单位：Institut Polytechnique de Paris; ENSAE Paris; Universite Paris-Pantheon-Assas; Universite Paris-Pantheon-Assas
摘要：This paper studies relationships between the local determinacy of a stationary equilibrium in the perfect foresight dynamics. and its local stability in dynamics arising from econometric learning procedures. Attention is focused on linear scalar economies where agents forecast only one period ahead, and with an arbitrary, but fixed, number of predetermined variables. In Such a framework, it is well known that there are no clear links between the determinacy of the stationary state in the perfe...
