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作者：Anesi, Vincent; Seidmann, Daniel J.
作者单位：University of Nottingham
摘要：We present a model of bargaining in which a committee searches over the policy space, successively amending the default by voting over proposals. Bargaining ends when proposers are unable or unwilling to amend the existing default, which is then implemented. Our main goal is to study the policies that can be implemented from any initial default in a pure-strategy stationary Markov perfect equilibrium for an interesting class of environments including multidimensional and infinite policy spaces...
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作者：Asheim, Geir B.; Zuber, Stephane
作者单位：University of Oslo; Paris School of Economics; Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)
摘要：We contribute to population ethics by proposing and axiomatizing rank-discounted critical-level generalized utilitarianism (RDCLU). Population ethics is needed for evaluation of policies, e.g., concerning climate change, where population size depends on the chosen policy. We show that critical-level generalized utilitarianism and (a version of) critical-level leximin are the limits of RDCLU for extreme values of the rank utility discount factor. Moreover, we establish how RDCLU avoids serious ...
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作者：Goswami, Mridu Prabal; Mitra, Manipushpak; Sen, Arunava
作者单位：Indian Statistical Institute; Indian Statistical Institute Delhi; Indian Statistical Institute; Indian Statistical Institute Kolkata
摘要：In this paper, we revisit a longstanding question on the structure of strategy-proof and Pareto-efficient social choice functions (SCFs) in classical exchange economies (Hurwicz 1972). Using techniques developed by Myerson in the context of auction design, we show that in a specific quasilinear domain, every Pareto-efficient and strategy-proof SCF that satisfies non-bossiness and a mild continuity property is dictatorial. The result holds for an arbitrary number of agents, but the two-person v...
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作者：Sobel, Joel
作者单位：University of California System; University of California San Diego
摘要：Each member of a group receives a signal about the unknown state of the world and decides on a utility-maximizing recommendation on the basis of that signal. The individuals have identical preferences. The group makes a decision that maximizes the common utility function assuming perfect pooling of the information in individual signals. An action profile is a group action and a recommendation from each individual. A collection of action profiles is rational if there exists an information struc...
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作者：Battaglini, Marco
作者单位：Princeton University
摘要：We present a dynamic theory of electoral competition to study the determinants of fiscal policy. In each period, two parties choose electoral platforms to maximize the expected number of elected representatives. The platforms include public expenditure, redistributive transfers, the tax rate, and the level of public debt. Voters cast their vote after seeing the platforms and elect representatives according to a majoritarian winner take all system. The level of debt, by affecting the budget con...
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作者：Prat, Julien; Jovanovic, Boyan
作者单位：Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); Institut Polytechnique de Paris; ENSAE Paris; Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Cientificas (CSIC); CSIC - Institut d'Analisi Economica (IAE); Barcelona School of Economics; New York University
摘要：We solve a long-term contracting problem with symmetric uncertainty about the agent's quality and a hidden action of the agent. As information about quality accumulates, incentives become easier to provide because the agent has less room to manipulate the principal's beliefs. This result is opposite to that in the literature on career concerns in which incentives via short-term contracts become harder to provide as the agent's quality is revealed over time.
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作者：Kamihigashi, Takashi; Stachurski, John
作者单位：Kobe University; Kobe University; Australian National University
摘要：This paper extends a family of well known stability theorems for monotone economies to a significantly larger class of models. We provide a set of general conditions for existence, uniqueness, and stability of stationary distributions when monotonicity holds. The conditions in our main result are both necessary and sufficient for global stability of monotone economies that satisfy a weak mixing condition introduced in the paper. Through our analysis, we develop new insights into the nature and...
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作者：Chambers, Christopher P.; Echenique, Federico
作者单位：University of California System; University of California San Diego; California Institute of Technology
摘要：We develop observable restrictions of well known theories of bargaining over money. We suppose that we observe a finite data set of bargaining outcomes, including data on allocations and disagreement points, but no information on utility functions. We ask when a given theory could generate the data. We show that if the disagreement point is fixed and symmetric, the Nash, utilitarian, and egalitarian max-min bargaining solutions are all observationally equivalent. Data compatible with these the...
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作者：Boergers, Tilman; Smith, Doug
作者单位：University of Michigan System; University of Michigan
摘要：We develop an analysis of voting rules that is robust in the sense that we do not make any assumption regarding voters' knowledge about each other. In dominant strategy voting rules, voters' behavior can be predicted uniquely without making any such assumption. However, on full domains, the only dominant strategy voting rules are random dictatorships. We show that the designer of a voting rule can achieve Pareto improvements over random dictatorship by choosing rules in which voters' behavior ...
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作者：Nava, Francesco; Piccione, Michele
作者单位：University of London; London School Economics & Political Science
摘要：This paper discusses community enforcement in infinitely repeated, two-action games with local interaction and uncertain monitoring. Each player interacts with and observes only a fixed set of opponents, of whom he is privately informed. The main result shows that when beliefs about the monitoring structure have full support, efficiency can be sustained with sequential equilibria that are independent of the players' beliefs. Stronger results are obtained when only acyclic monitoring structures...
