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作者：Chen, Ying; Eraslan, Huelya
作者单位：Johns Hopkins University; University of Southampton
摘要：We analyze a three-player legislative bargaining game over an ideological and a distributive decision. Legislators are privately informed about their ideological intensities, i.e., the weight placed on the ideological decision relative to the weight placed on the distributive decision. Communication takes place before a proposal is offered and majority rule voting determines the outcome. We show that it is not possible for all legislators to communicate informatively. In particular, the legisl...
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作者：Attar, Andrea; Mariotti, Thomas; Salanie, Francois
作者单位：University of Rome Tor Vergata; University of Rome Tor Vergata; Universite de Toulouse; Universite Toulouse 1 Capitole; Toulouse School of Economics
摘要：A seller of a divisible good faces several identical buyers. The quality of the good may be low or high, and is the seller's private information. The seller has strictly convex preferences that satisfy a single-crossing property. Buyers compete by posting menus of nonexclusive contracts, so that the seller can simultaneously and privately trade with several buyers. We provide a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of a pure-strategy equilibrium. Aggregate equilibrium trades are...
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作者：Matsuyama, Kiminori
作者单位：Northwestern University
摘要：This paper builds models of nonlinear dynamics in the aggregate investment and borrower net worth to study the causes and nature of endogenous credit cycles. The basic model has two types of projects: the Good and the Bad. The Good projects rely on the inputs supplied by others who could undertake investment in the future, thereby improving their net worth. The Bad projects are independently profitable so that they do not improve the net worth of other borrowers. Furthermore, they are subject ...
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作者：Balkenborg, Dieter; Hofbauer, Josef; Kuzmics, Christoph
作者单位：University of Exeter; University of Vienna; University of Bielefeld
摘要：We call a correspondence, defined on the set of mixed strategy profiles, a generalized best reply correspondence if it (i) has a product structure, (ii) is upper hemicontinuous, (iii) always includes a best reply to any mixed strategy profile, and (iv) is convex-and closed-valued. For each generalized best reply correspondence, we define a generalized best reply dynamics as a differential inclusion based on it. We call a face of the set of mixed strategy profiles a minimally asymptotically sta...
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作者：Mishra, Debasis; Roy, Souvik
作者单位：Indian Statistical Institute; Indian Statistical Institute Delhi
摘要：We consider deterministic dominant strategy implementation in multidimensional dichotomous domains in a private values and quasilinear utility setting. In such multidimensional domains, an agent's type is characterized by a single number, the value of the agent, and a nonempty set of acceptable alternatives. Each acceptable alternative gives the agent utility equal to his value and other alternatives give him zero utility. We identify a new condition, which we call generation monotonicity, tha...
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作者：Skiadas, Costis
作者单位：Northwestern University
摘要：Preferences are defined over payoffs that are contingent on a finite number of states representing a horse race (Knightian uncertainty) and a roulette wheel (objective risk). The class of scale-invariant (SI) ambiguity-averse preferences, in a broad sense, is uniquely characterized by a multiple-prior utility representation. Adding a weak certainty-independence axiom is shown to imply either unit co-efficient of relative risk aversion (CRRA) toward roulette risk or SI maxmin expected utility. ...
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作者：Karantounias, Anastasios G.
作者单位：Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - Atlanta
摘要：This paper studies the design of optimal fiscal policy when a government that fully trusts the probability model of government expenditures faces a fearful public that forms pessimistic expectations. We identify two forces that shape our results. On the one hand, the government has an incentive to concentrate tax distortions on events that it considers unlikely relative to the pessimistic public. On the other hand, the endogeneity of the public's expectations gives rise to a novel motive for e...
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作者：Cherepanov, Vadim; Feddersen, Timothy; Sandroni, Alvaro
作者单位：University of Pennsylvania; Northwestern University
摘要：In 1908, the Welsh neurologist and psychoanalyst Ernest Jones described human beings as rationalizers whose behavior is governed by the necessity of providing an explanation. We construct a formal and testable model of rationalization in which a decision maker selects her preferred alternative from among those that she can rationalize.
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作者：Mandler, Michael
作者单位：University of London; Royal Holloway University London
摘要：If agents are ambiguity-averse and can invest in productive assets, asset prices can robustly exhibit indeterminacy in the markets that open after the productive investment has been launched. For indeterminacy to occur, the aggregate supply of goods must appear in precise configurations, but the investment levels that generate these supplies arise systematically. That indeterminacy arises only at a knife-edge set of aggregate supplies allows for a simple explanation of the volatility of asset ...
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作者：Hwang, Sung-Ha; Katsoulakis, Markos; Rey-Bellet, Luc
作者单位：Sogang University; University of Massachusetts System; University of Massachusetts Amherst; University of Crete
摘要：Spatial evolutionary games model individuals playing a game with their neighbors in a spatial domain and describe the time evolution of the strategy profile of individuals over space. We derive integro-differential equations as deterministic approximations of strategy revision stochastic processes. These equations generalize the existing ordinary differential equations such as replicator dynamics and provide powerful tools for investigating the problem of equilibrium selection. Deterministic e...
