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作者：Ambrus, Attila; Azevedo, Eduardo M.; Kamada, Yuichiro
作者单位：Harvard University
摘要：We investigate situations in which agents can communicate to each other only through a chain of intermediators, for example, because they have to obey institutionalized communication protocols. We assume that all involved in the communication are strategic and might want to influence the action taken by the final receiver. The set of pure strategy equilibrium outcomes is simple to characterize, is monotonic in each intermediator's bias, and does not depend on the order of intermediators; inter...
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作者：Chen, Jing; Micali, Silvio
作者单位：Institute for Advanced Study - USA; State University of New York (SUNY) System; Stony Brook University; Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
摘要：Shimoji and Watson (1998) prove that a strategy of an extensive game is rationalizable in the sense of Pearce if and only if it survives the maximal elimination of conditionally dominated strategies. Briefly, this process iteratively eliminates conditionally dominated strategies according to a specific order, which is also the start of an order of elimination of weakly dominated strategies. Since the final set of possible payoff profiles, or terminal nodes, surviving iterated elimination of we...
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作者：Braido, Luis H. B.
摘要：This paper studies recursive exchange economies with short sales. Agents maximize discounted expected utility. The asset structure is general and includes real securities, infinite-lived stocks, options, and other derivatives. The main result shows the existence of a competitive equilibrium process that is stationary and has an invariant ergodic measure. Ergodicity is required in finance for time series analysis of structural asset pricing models. This equilibrium property is difficult to obta...
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作者：Ordonez, Guillermo L.
作者单位：University of Pennsylvania
摘要：Reputation concerns in credit markets restrain borrowers' temptations to take excessive risk. The strength of these concerns depends on the behavior of other borrowers, rendering the reputational discipline fragile and subject to breakdowns without obvious changes in economic fundamentals. Furthermore, at an aggregate level, breakdowns are clustered among borrowers who have intermediate and good reputations, magnifying otherwise small economic shocks.
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作者：Mailath, George J.; Postlewaite, Andrew; Samuelson, Larry
作者单位：University of Pennsylvania; Yale University
摘要：Different markets are cleared by different types of prices: seller-specific prices that are uniform across buyers in some markets and personalized prices tailored to the buyer in others. We examine a setting in which buyers and sellers make investments before matching in a competitive market. We introduce the notion of premuneration valuesthe values to the transacting agents prior to any transferscreated by a buyerseller match. Personalized-price equilibrium outcomes are independent of premune...
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作者：Ravikumar, B.; Zhang, Yuzhe
作者单位：Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - St. Louis; Texas A&M University System; Texas A&M University College Station
摘要：We study the optimal auditing of a taxpayer's income in a dynamic principalagent model of hidden income. Taxpayers in our model initially have low income and stochastically transit to high income that is an absorbing state. A low-income taxpayer who transits to high income can underreport his true income and evade his taxes. With a constant absolute risk-aversion utility function and a costly and imperfect auditing technology, we show that the optimal auditing mechanism in our model consists o...
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作者：Buzard, Kristy; Watson, Joel
作者单位：University of California System; University of California San Diego
摘要：This paper examines a class of contractual relationships with specific investment, a nondurable trading opportunity, and renegotiation. Trade actions are modeled as individual and trade-action-based option contracts (nonforcing contracts) are explored. The paper introduces the distinction between divided and unified investment and trade actions, and it shows the key role this distinction plays in determining whether efficient investment and trade can be achieved. Under a nonforcing dual-option...
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作者：Kartik, Navin; Tercieux, Olivier
作者单位：Columbia University; Paris School of Economics
摘要：We generalize the canonical problem of Nash implementation by allowing agents to voluntarily provide discriminatory signals, i.e., evidence. Evidence can either take the form of hard information or, more generally, have differential but nonprohibitive costs in different states. In such environments, social choice functions that are not Maskin-monotonic can be implemented. We formulate a more general property, evidence monotonicity, and show that this is a necessary condition for implementation...
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作者：Battigalli, Pierpaolo; Friedenberg, Amanda
作者单位：Arizona State University; Arizona State University-Tempe
摘要：Battigalli and Siniscalchi (2002) formalize the idea of forward induction reasoning as rationality and common strong belief of rationality (RCSBR). Here we study the behavioral implications of RCSBR across all type structures. Formally, we show that RCSBR is characterized by a solution concept we call extensive form best response sets (EFBRS's). It turns out that the EFBRS concept is equivalent to a concept already proposed in the literature, namely directed rationalizability (Battigalli and S...
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作者：Wiseman, Thomas
作者单位：University of Texas System; University of Texas Austin
摘要：The payoff matrix of a finite stage game is realized randomly and then the stage game is repeated infinitely. The distribution over states of the world (a state corresponds to a payoff matrix) is commonly known, but players do not observe nature's choice. Over time, they can learn the state in two ways. After each round, each player observes his own realized payoff (which may be stochastic, conditional on the state) and he observes a noisy public signal of the state (whose informativeness may ...
