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作者：Ostrovsky, Michael; Paes Leme, Renato
作者单位：Stanford University
摘要：We show that the class of preferences satisfying the gross substitutes condition of [Kelso and Crawford, 1982] is strictly larger than the class of endowed assignment valuations of [Hatfield and Milgrom, 2005], thus resolving the open question posed by the latter paper. In particular, our result implies that not every substitutable valuation function can be decomposed into a combination of unit-demand valuations.
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作者：Ergin, Haluk; Sarver, Todd
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Berkeley; Duke University
摘要：We study preferences for timing of resolution of objective uncertainty in a menu-choice model with two stages of information arrival. We characterize a general class of utility representations called hidden action representations, which interpret an intrinsic preference for timing of resolution of uncertainty as if an unobservable action is taken between the resolution of the two periods of information arrival. These representations permit a richer class of preferences for timing than was poss...
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作者：Sugaya, Takuo
作者单位：Stanford University
摘要：We study repeated games with imperfect public monitoring and unequal discounting. We characterize the limit set of perfect and public equilibrium payoffs as discount factors converge to 1 with the relative patience between players fixed. We show that the pairwise and individual full rank conditions are sufficient for the folk theorem.
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作者：Bouton, Laurent; Gratton, Gabriele
作者单位：Georgetown University
摘要：The majority runoff system is widely used around the world, yet our understanding of its properties and of voters' behavior is limited. In this paper, we fully characterize the set of strictly perfect voting equilibria in large three-candidate majority runoff elections. Considering all possible distributions of preference orderings and intensities, we prove that only two types of equilibria can exist. First, there are always equilibria in which only two candidates receive votes. Second, there ...
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作者：Riedel, Frank; Hellmann, Tobias
作者单位：University of Bielefeld
摘要：Foster and Hart propose a measure of riskiness for discrete random variables. Their defining equation has no solution for many common continuous distributions. We show how to extend consistently the definition of riskiness to continuous random variables. For many continuous random variables, the risk measure is equal to the worst-case risk measure, i.e., the maximal possible loss incurred by that gamble. For many discrete gambles with a large number of values, the Foster-Hart riskiness is clos...
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作者：Fudenberg, Drew; Kamada, Yuichiro
作者单位：Harvard University; University of California System; University of California Berkeley
摘要：Rationalizable partition-confirmed equilibrium (RPCE) describes the steady-state outcomes of rational learning in extensive-form games when rationality is common knowledge and players observe a partition of the terminal nodes. RPCE allows players to make inferences about unobserved play by others. We discuss the implications of this using numerous examples, and discuss the relationship of RPCE to other solution concepts in the literature.
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作者：Lobel, Ilan; Sadler, Evan
作者单位：New York University
摘要：We study perfect Bayesian equilibria of a sequential social learning model in which agents in a network learn about an underlying state by observing neighbors' choices. In contrast with prior work, we do not assume that the agents' sets of neighbors are mutually independent. We introduce a new metric of information diffusion in social learning that is weaker than the traditional aggregation metric. We show that if a minimal connectivity condition holds and neighborhoods are independent, inform...
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作者：Casajus, Andre
作者单位：HHL Leipzig Graduate School of Management
摘要：Within a simple setup, we show that proportional taxation is implied by three properties: efficiency, symmetry, and monotonicity. Efficiency: redistribution has no cost. Symmetry: members of the society with the same performance obtain the same reward after redistribution. Monotonicity: whenever both the performance of a certain member of the society as well as the overall performance of the society do not decrease, then this member's reward after redistribution does not decrease.
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作者：Baetz, Oliver
作者单位：University of Cambridge
摘要：This paper develops a simple model in which a social hierarchy emerges endogenously when agents form a network for complementary interaction (activity). Specifically, we assume that agents are ex ante identical and their best response activity, as well as their value function, increases (strictly) concavely in the total activity of their neighbors in the network. There exists a unique and stable positive activity equilibrium on exogenous networks under mild conditions. When we endogenize netwo...
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作者：Nirei, Makoto
作者单位：Hitotsubashi University
摘要：This study demonstrates that the interactions of firm-level indivisible investments give rise to aggregate fluctuations without aggregate exogenous shocks. When investments are indivisible, aggregate capital is determined by the number of firms that invest. I develop a method to derive the closed-form distribution of the number of investing firms when each firm's initial capital level varies stochastically. This method shows that idiosyncratic shocks may lead to nonvanishing aggregate fluctuat...
