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作者：Hart, Sergiu; Reny, Philip J.
作者单位：Hebrew University of Jerusalem; Hebrew University of Jerusalem; University of Chicago
摘要：Consider the problem of maximizing the revenue from selling a number of goods to a single buyer. We show that, unlike the case of one good, when the buyer's values for the goods increase, the seller's maximal revenue may well decrease. We then identify two circumstances where monotonicity does obtain: when optimal mechanisms are deterministic and symmetric, and when they have submodular prices. Next, through simple and transparent examples, we clarify the need for and the advantage of randomiz...
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作者：Bade, Sophie
作者单位：University of London; Royal Holloway University London; Max Planck Society
摘要：The study of matching problems typically assumes that agents precisely know their preferences over the goods to be assigned. Within applied contexts, this assumption stands out as particularly counterfactual. Parents typically do invest a large amount of time and resources to find the best school for their children; doctors run costly tests to establish the best kidney for a given patient. In this paper, I introduce the assumption of endogenous information acquisition into otherwise standard h...
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作者：Heller, Yuval
作者单位：University of Oxford
摘要：We study a variant of the repeated prisoner's dilemma with uncertain horizon, in which each player chooses his foresight ability; that is, the timing in which he is informed about the realized length of the interaction. In addition, each player has an independent probability to observe the opponent's foresight ability. We show that if this probability is not too close to 0 or 1, then the game admits an evolutionarily stable strategy, in which agents who look one step ahead and agents who look ...
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作者：Abreu, Dilip; Pearce, David; Stacchetti, Ennio
作者单位：Princeton University; New York University
摘要：A two-person infinite-horizon bargaining model where one of the players may have either of two discount factors, has a multiplicity of perfect Bayesian equilibria. Introducing the slightest possibility that either player may be one of a rich variety of stationary behavioral types singles out a particular solution and appears to support some axiomatic treatments in the early literature in their conclusion that there is a negligible delay to agreement. Perturbing the model with a slightly broade...
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作者：Cherchye, Laurens; Demuynck, Thomas; De Rock, Bram
作者单位：KU Leuven; Maastricht University; Universite Libre de Bruxelles
摘要：The transferable utility hypothesis underlies important theoretical results in household economics. We provide a revealed preference framework for bringing this (theoretically appealing) hypothesis to observational data. We establish revealed preference conditions that must be satisfied for observed household consumption behavior to be consistent with transferable utility. We also show that these conditions are testable by means of integer programming methods.
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作者：Kaya, Ayca; Liu, Qingmin
作者单位：University of Miami; Columbia University
摘要：We study the role that price transparency plays in determining the efficiency and surplus division in a sequential bargaining model of price formation with asymmetric information. Under natural assumptions on type distributions and for any discount factor, we show that the unobservability of past negotiations leads to lower prices and faster trading. Unobservability, therefore, enhances the Coasian effect by fostering efficiency and diverting more of the surplus to the player who possesses pri...
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作者：Kesten, Onur; Uenver, M. Utku
作者单位：Carnegie Mellon University; Boston College
摘要：We introduce a new notion of ex ante stability (or fairness) that would be desirable for a school-choice mechanism to satisfy. Our criterion stipulates that a mechanism must be stable based solely on the probabilities that each student will be assigned to different schools, i.e., the assignment must be viewed as stable even before students know which school they will end up going to. This is in contrast to much of the existing literature, which has instead focused on ex post stability, meaning...
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作者：Keller, Godfrey; Rady, Sven
作者单位：University of Oxford; University of Bonn; University of Bonn
摘要：We study a continuous-time game of strategic experimentation in which the players try to assess the failure rate of some new equipment or technology. Breakdowns occur at the jump times of a Poisson process whose unknown intensity is either high or low. In marked contrast to existing models, we find that the cooperative value function does not exhibit smooth pasting at the efficient cutoff belief. This finding extends to the boundaries between continuation and stopping regions in Markov perfect...
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作者：Khan, M. Ali; Rath, Kali P.; Sun, Yeneng; Yu, Haomiao
作者单位：Johns Hopkins University; University of Notre Dame; National University of Singapore; Toronto Metropolitan University
摘要：This paper elucidates the conceptual role that independent randomization plays in non-cooperative game theory. In the context of large (atomless) games in normal form, we present precise formalizations of the notions of a mixed strategy equilibrium (MSE) and of a randomized strategy equilibrium in distributional form (RSED). We offer a resolution of two longstanding open problems and show that (i) any MSE induces a RSED and any RSED can be lifted to a MSE, and (ii) a mixed strategy profile is ...
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作者：Peski, Marcin; Wiseman, Thomas
作者单位：University of Toronto; University of Texas System; University of Texas Austin
摘要：We characterize perfect public equilibrium payoffs in dynamic stochastic games in the case where the length of the period shrinks, but players' rate of time discounting and the transition rate between states remain fixed. We present a meaningful definition of the feasible and individually rational payoff sets for this environment, and we prove a folk theorem under imperfect monitoring. Our setting differs significantly from the case considered in previous literature (Dutta 1995, Fudenberg and ...
