Efficiency in repeated games with local interaction and uncertain local monitoring

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Nava, Francesco; Piccione, Michele
• 署名单位: University of London; London School Economics & Political Science
• 刊物名称: THEORETICAL ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1933-6837
• DOI: 10.3982/TE1200
• 发表日期: 2014-01-01
• 页码: 279-312
• 关键词: Local monitoring; repeated games; COOPERATION; networks

摘要

This paper discusses community enforcement in infinitely repeated, two-action games with local interaction and uncertain monitoring. Each player interacts with and observes only a fixed set of opponents, of whom he is privately informed. The main result shows that when beliefs about the monitoring structure have full support, efficiency can be sustained with sequential equilibria that are independent of the players' beliefs. Stronger results are obtained when only acyclic monitoring structures are allowed or players have unit discount rates. These equilibria satisfy numerous robustness properties.