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作者：Levine, David K.; Modica, Salvatore
作者单位：Washington University (WUSTL); European University Institute; University of Palermo
摘要：We characterize transitions between stochastically stable states and relative ergodic probabilities in the theory of the evolution of conventions. We give an application to the fall of hegemonies in the evolutionary theory of institutions and conflict, and illustrate the theory with the fall of the Qing dynasty and the rise of communism in China.
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作者：Acemoglu, Daron; Chernozhukov, Victor; Yildiz, Muhamet
作者单位：Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
摘要：Under the assumption that individuals know the conditional distributions of signals given the payoff-relevant parameters, existing results conclude that as individuals observe infinitely many signals, their beliefs about the parameters will eventually merge. We first show that these results are fragile when individuals are uncertain about the signal distributions: given any such model, vanishingly small individual uncertainty about the signal distributions can lead to substantial (nonvanishing...
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作者：Burkett, Justin
作者单位：Wake Forest University
摘要：I study a principal's optimal choice of constraint for an agent participating in an auction (or auction-like allocation mechanism). I give necessary and sufficient conditions on the principal's beliefs about the value of the item for a simple budget constraint to be the optimal contract. The results link the observed use of budget constraints to their use in models incorporating budget-constrained bidders. Other implications of the model are that a general revenue equivalence result applies an...
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作者：Chiappori, Pierre-Andre; Reny, Philip J.
作者单位：Columbia University; University of Chicago
摘要：We consider a matching model in which individuals belonging to two populations (males and females) can match to share their exogenous income risk. Within each population, individuals can be ranked by risk aversion in the Arrow-Pratt sense. The model permits nontransferable utility, a context in which few general results have previously been derived. We show that in this framework a stable matching always exists, it is generically unique, and it is negatively assortative: for any two matched co...
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作者：Velez, Rodrigo A.
作者单位：Texas A&M University System; Texas A&M University College Station
摘要：We study equitable allocation of indivisible goods and money among agents with other-regarding preferences. First, we argue that Foley's (1967) equity test, i.e., the requirement that no agent prefers the allocation obtained by swapping her consumption with another agent, is suitable for our environment. Then we establish the existence of allocations passing this test for a general domain of preferences that accommodates prominent other-regarding preferences. Our results are relevant for equit...
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作者：Bhargava, Mohit; Majumdar, Dipjyoti; Sen, Arunava
作者单位：Concordia University - Canada; Indian Statistical Institute; Indian Statistical Institute Kolkata
摘要：We study the consequences of positive correlation of beliefs in the design of voting rules in a model with an arbitrary number of voters. We propose a notion of positive correlation, based on the likelihood of agreement of the k-best alternatives (for any k) of two orders called top-set (TS) correlation. We characterize the set of ordinal Bayesian incentive compatible (OBIC) (d'Aspremont and Peleg 1988) voting rules with TS-correlated beliefs and additionally satisfy robustness with respect to...
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作者：Noguchi, Yuichi
摘要：In this paper, I provide a characterization of a set of probability measures with which a prior weakly merges. In this regard, I introduce the concept of conditioning rules that represent the regularities of probability measures and define the eventual generation of probability measures by a family of conditioning rules. I then show that a set of probability measures is learnable (i.e., all probability measures in the set are weakly merged by a prior) if and only if all probability measures in...
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作者：Chandrasekher, Madhav
作者单位：Arizona State University; Arizona State University-Tempe
摘要：This paper studies an infinite-horizon repeated moral hazard problem where a single principal employs several agents. We assume that the principal cannot observe the agents' effort choices; however, agents can observe each other and can be contractually required to make observation reports to the principal. Observation reports, if truthful, can serve as a monitoring instrument to discipline the agents. However, reports are cheap talk so that it is also possible for agents to collude, i.e., whe...
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作者：Oyama, Daisuke; Sandholm, William H.; Tercieux, Olivier
作者单位：University of Tokyo; University of Wisconsin System; University of Wisconsin Madison; Paris School of Economics; Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)
摘要：We consider a model of evolution in games in which a revising agent observes the actions of a random number of randomly sampled opponents and then chooses a best response to the distribution of actions in the sample. We provide a condition on the distribution of sample sizes under which an iterated p-dominant equilibrium is almost globally asymptotically stable under these dynamics. We show under an additional condition on the sample size distribution that in super-modular games, an almost glo...
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作者：Calvo-Armengol, Antoni; de Marti, Joan; Prat, Andrea
作者单位：Autonomous University of Barcelona; ICREA; Barcelona School of Economics; Pompeu Fabra University; Columbia University; Columbia University
摘要：We study the information flows that arise among a set of agents with local knowledge and directed payoff interactions, which differ among pairs of agents. First, we study the equilibrium of a game where, before making decisions, agents can invest in pairwise active communication (speaking) and pairwise passive communication (listening). This leads to a full characterization of information and influence flows. Second, we show that when the coordination motive dominates the adaptation motive, th...
