On the relationship between individual and group decisions

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Sobel, Joel
• 署名单位: University of California System; University of California San Diego
• 刊物名称: THEORETICAL ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1933-6837
• DOI: 10.3982/TE1185
• 发表日期: 2014-01-01
• 页码: 163-185
• 关键词: Statistical decision problem; group polarization; behavioral economics; PSYCHOLOGY; forecasting

摘要

Each member of a group receives a signal about the unknown state of the world and decides on a utility-maximizing recommendation on the basis of that signal. The individuals have identical preferences. The group makes a decision that maximizes the common utility function assuming perfect pooling of the information in individual signals. An action profile is a group action and a recommendation from each individual. A collection of action profiles is rational if there exists an information structure under which all elements in the collection arise with positive probability. With no restrictions on the information structure, essentially all action profiles are rational. In fact, given any distribution over action profiles, it is possible to find an information structure that approximates the distribution. In a monotone environment in which individuals receive conditionally independent signals, essentially any single action profile is rational, although some collections of action profiles are not.