Strategy proofness and Pareto efficiency in quasilinear exchange economies

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Goswami, Mridu Prabal; Mitra, Manipushpak; Sen, Arunava
• 署名单位: Indian Statistical Institute; Indian Statistical Institute Delhi; Indian Statistical Institute; Indian Statistical Institute Kolkata
• 刊物名称: THEORETICAL ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1933-6837
• DOI: 10.3982/TE1214
• 发表日期: 2014-05-01
• 页码: 361-381
• 关键词: Exchange economies; strategy proofness; Pareto efficiency; dictatorship

摘要

In this paper, we revisit a longstanding question on the structure of strategy-proof and Pareto-efficient social choice functions (SCFs) in classical exchange economies (Hurwicz 1972). Using techniques developed by Myerson in the context of auction design, we show that in a specific quasilinear domain, every Pareto-efficient and strategy-proof SCF that satisfies non-bossiness and a mild continuity property is dictatorial. The result holds for an arbitrary number of agents, but the two-person version does not require either the non-bossiness or the continuity assumptions. It also follows that the dictatorship conclusion holds on any super-set of this domain. We also provide a minimum consumption guarantee result in the spirit of Serizawa andWeymark (2003).