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作者：Ely, Jeffrey C.; Siegel, Ron
作者单位：Northwestern University
摘要：We investigate a common-value labor setting in which firms interview a worker prior to hiring. When firms have private information about the worker's value and interview decisions are kept private, many firms may enter the market, interview, and hire with positive probability. When firms' interview decisions are revealed, severe adverse selection arises. As a result, all firms except for the highest-ranked firm are excluded from the hiring process.
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作者：Mueller-Frank, Manuel
作者单位：University of Oxford
摘要：This paper provides a formal characterization of the process of rational learning in social networks. Agents receive initial private information and select an action out of a choice set under uncertainty in each of infinitely many periods, observing the history of choices of their neighbors. Choices are made based on a common behavioral rule. Conditions under which rational learning leads to global consensus, local indifference, and local disagreement are characterized. In the general setting ...
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作者：Matthews, Steven A.
作者单位：University of Pennsylvania
摘要：This paper concerns multistage games, with and without discounting, in which each player can increase the level of an action over time so as to increase the other players' future payoffs. An action profile is said to be achievable if it is the limit point of a subgame perfect equilibrium path. Necessary conditions are derived for achievability under relatively general conditions. They imply that any efficient profile that is approximately achievable must be in the core of the underlying coalit...
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作者：Vida, Peter; Forges, Francoise
作者单位：University of Mannheim; Universite PSL; Universite Paris-Dauphine
摘要：We show that essentially every communication equilibrium of any finite Bayesian game with two players can be implemented as a strategic form correlated equilibrium of an extended game, in which before choosing actions as in the Bayesian game, the players engage in a possibly infinitely long (but in equilibrium almost surely finite), direct, cheap talk.
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作者：Manzini, Paola; Mariotti, Marco; Tyson, Christopher J.
作者单位：University of St Andrews; IZA Institute Labor Economics; University of London; Queen Mary University London
摘要：We study two-stage choice procedures in which the decision maker first preselects the alternatives whose values according to a criterion pass a menu-dependent threshold and then maximizes a second criterion to narrow the selection further. This framework overlaps with several existing models that have various interpretations and impose various additional restrictions on behavior. We show that the general class of procedures is characterized by acyclicity of the revealed first-stage separation ...
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作者：Moldovanu, Benny; Shi, Xianwen
作者单位：University of Bonn; University of Toronto
摘要：A committee decides by unanimity whether to accept the current alternative or to continue costly search. Each alternative is described by a vector of distinct attributes and each committee member can privately assess the quality of one attribute (her specialty). Preferences are heterogeneous and interdependent: each specialist values all attributes, but puts a higher weight on her specialty (partisanship). We study how acceptance standards and members' welfare vary with the amount of conflict ...
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作者：Hafalir, Isa E.; Yenmez, M. Bumin; Yildirim, Muhammed A.
作者单位：Carnegie Mellon University; Harvard University
摘要：The prevalent affirmative action policy in school choice limits the number of admitted majority students to give minority students higher chances to attend their desired schools. There have been numerous efforts to reconcile affirmative action policies with celebrated matching mechanisms such as the deferred acceptance and top trading cycles algorithms. Nevertheless, it is theoretically shown that under these algorithms, the policy based on majority quotas may be detrimental to minorities. Usi...
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作者：Angeletos, George-Marios; Pavan, Alessandro
作者单位：Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT); University of Zurich; Northwestern University
摘要：Global games with endogenous information often exhibit multiple equilibria. In this paper, we show how one can nevertheless identify useful predictions that are robust across all equilibria and that cannot be delivered in the common-knowledge counterparts of these games. Our analysis is conducted within a flexible family of games of regime change, which have been used to model, inter alia, speculative currency attacks, debt crises, and political change. The endogeneity of information originate...
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作者：Esponda, Ignacio
作者单位：New York University
摘要：I introduce a new framework to study environments with both structural and strategic uncertainty, different from Harsanyi's (19671968) Bayesian games, that allows a researcher to test the robustness of Nash predictions while maintaining certain desirable restrictions on players' beliefs. The solution concept applied to this environment is rationalizable conjectural equilibrium (RCE), which integrates both learning from feedback (in the spirit of self-confirming equilibrium) and from introspect...
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作者：Sadowski, Philipp
作者单位：Duke University
摘要：Following Kreps (1979), I consider a decision maker who is uncertain about her future taste. This uncertainty leaves the decision maker with a preference for flexibility: When choosing among menus that contain alternatives for future choice, she weakly prefers menus with additional alternatives. Standard representations that accommodate this choice pattern cannot distinguish tastes (indexed by a subjective state space) and beliefs (a probability measure over the subjective states) as different...
