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作者：Sher, Itai; Vohra, Rakesh
作者单位：University of Minnesota System; University of Minnesota Twin Cities; University of Pennsylvania; University of Pennsylvania
摘要：We study a seller's optimal mechanism for maximizing revenue when a buyer may present evidence relevant to her value. We show that a condition very close to transparency of buyer segments is necessary and sufficient for the optimal mechanism to be deterministichence, akin to classic third degree price discriminationindependently of nonevidence characteristics. We also find another sufficient condition depending on both evidence and valuations, whose content is that evidence is hierarchical. Wh...
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作者：Wolitzky, Alexander
作者单位：Stanford University
摘要：A key obstacle to coordination and cooperation in many networked environments is that behavior in each bilateral relationship is not observable to individuals outside that relationship: that is, information is local. This paper investigates when players can use communication to replicate any outcome that would have been sustainable were this information public. A benchmark result is that if only cheap talk communication is possible, then public information can only be replicated if the network...
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作者：McLean, Richard P.; Postlewaite, Andrew
作者单位：Rutgers University System; Rutgers University New Brunswick; University of Pennsylvania
摘要：It is well known that the ability of the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism to implement efficient outcomes for private value choice problems does not extend to interdependent value problems. When an agent's type affects other agents' utilities, it may not be incentive compatible for him to truthfully reveal his type when faced with VCG payments. We show that when agents are informationally small, there exist small modifications to the VCG transfers that restore incentive compatibility. We ...
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作者：Morimoto, Shuhei; Serizawa, Shigehiro
作者单位：Kobe University; University of Osaka
摘要：We consider the problem of allocating objects to a group of agents and how much agents should pay. Each agent receives at most one object and has non-quasi-linear preferences. Non-quasi-linear preferences describe environments where payments influence agents' abilities to utilize objects or derive benefits from them. The minimum price Walrasian (MPW) rule is the rule that assigns a minimum price Walrasian equilibrium allocation to each preference profile. We establish that the MPW rule is the ...
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作者：Koenig, Michael D.; Tessone, Claudio J.; Zenou, Yves
作者单位：University of Zurich; Swiss Federal Institutes of Technology Domain; ETH Zurich; Stockholm University
摘要：We develop a dynamic network formation model that can explain the observed nestedness in real-world networks. Links are formed on the basis of agents' centrality and have an exponentially distributed lifetime. We use stochastic stability to identify the networks to which the network formation process converges and find that they are nested split graphs. We completely determine the topological properties of the stochastically stable networks and show that they match features exhibited by real-w...
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作者：Calcagno, Riccardo; Kamada, Yuichiro; Lovo, Stefano; Sugaya, Takuo
作者单位：emlyon business school; Yale University; Hautes Etudes Commerciales (HEC) Paris; Stanford University
摘要：We study games endowed with a pre-play phase in which players prepare the actions that will be implemented at a predetermined deadline. In the preparation phase, each player stochastically receives opportunities to revise her actions, and the finally revised action is taken at the deadline. In two-player common interest games, where there exists a best action profile for all players, this best action profile is the only equilibrium outcome of the dynamic game. In opposing interest games, which...
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作者：Vartiainen, Hannu
作者单位：University of Helsinki
摘要：We study collective choice via an endogenous agenda setting process. At each stage, a status quo is implemented unless it is replaced by a majority (winning coalition) with a new status quo outcome. The process continues until the prevailing status quo is no longer challenged. We impose a one-time deviation restriction on the feasible policy processes, reflecting the farsightedness of voters. The key feature of the solution is history dependence. The existence of the solution is proven by iter...
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作者：Peski, Marcin
作者单位：University of Toronto
摘要：We analyze discounted repeated games with incomplete information, such that the players' payoffs depend only on their own type (known-own payoff case). We describe an algorithm for finding all equilibrium payoffs in games for which there exists an open set of belief-free equilibria of Horner and Lovo (2009). This includes generic games with one-sided incomplete information and a large and important class of games with multisided incomplete information. When players become sufficiently patient,...
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作者：Acemoglu, Daron; Bimpikis, Kostas; Ozdaglar, Asuman
作者单位：Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT); Stanford University; Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
摘要：We develop a model of information exchange through communication and investigate its implications for information aggregation in large societies. An underlying state determines payoffs from different actions. Agents decide which other agents to form a costly communication link with, incurring the associated cost. After receiving a private signal correlated with the underlying state, the agents exchange information over the induced communication network until they take an (irreversible) action....
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作者：Balasko, Yves
作者单位：Pontificia Universidade Catolica do Rio de Janeiro; University of York - UK
摘要：The transfer problem refers to the possibility that a donor country could end up better off after giving away some resources to another country. The simplest version of that problem can be formulated in a two consumer exchange economy with fixed total resources. The existence of a transfer problem at some equilibrium is known to be equivalent to instability in the case of two goods. This characterization is extended to an arbitrary number of goods by showing that a transfer problem exists at a...
