On the consistency of data with bargaining theories

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Chambers, Christopher P.; Echenique, Federico
• 署名单位: University of California System; University of California San Diego; California Institute of Technology
• 刊物名称: THEORETICAL ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1933-6837
• DOI: 10.3982/TE1095
• 发表日期: 2014-01-01
• 页码: 137-162
• 关键词: Revealed preference; Nash bargaining

摘要

We develop observable restrictions of well known theories of bargaining over money. We suppose that we observe a finite data set of bargaining outcomes, including data on allocations and disagreement points, but no information on utility functions. We ask when a given theory could generate the data. We show that if the disagreement point is fixed and symmetric, the Nash, utilitarian, and egalitarian max-min bargaining solutions are all observationally equivalent. Data compatible with these theories are, in turn, characterized by the property of co-monotonicity of bargaining outcomes. We establish different tests for each of the theories under consideration in the case in which the disagreement point can be variable. Our results are readily applicable, outside of the bargaining framework, to testing the tax code for compliance with the principle of equal loss.