Dynamic contracts when the agent's quality is unknown

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Prat, Julien; Jovanovic, Boyan
• 署名单位: Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); Institut Polytechnique de Paris; ENSAE Paris; Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Cientificas (CSIC); CSIC - Institut d'Analisi Economica (IAE); Barcelona School of Economics; New York University
• 刊物名称: THEORETICAL ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1933-6837
• DOI: 10.3982/TE1439
• 发表日期: 2014-09-01
• 页码: 865-914
• 关键词: Principal-agent model; optimal contract; learning; private information; reputation; career; D82; D83; E24; J41

摘要

We solve a long-term contracting problem with symmetric uncertainty about the agent's quality and a hidden action of the agent. As information about quality accumulates, incentives become easier to provide because the agent has less room to manipulate the principal's beliefs. This result is opposite to that in the literature on career concerns in which incentives via short-term contracts become harder to provide as the agent's quality is revealed over time.