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作者：Schmedders, Karl
作者单位：Northwestern University
摘要：This paper examines the two-fund separation paradigm in the context of an infinite-horizon general equilibrium model with dynamically complete markets and heterogeneous consumers with time-and state-separable utility functions. With the exception of the dynamic structure, we maintain the assumptions of the classical static models that exhibit two-fund separation with a riskless security. Agents have equi-cautious HARA utility functions. In addition to a security with state-independent payoffs,...
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作者：Athey, Susan; Miller, David A.
作者单位：Harvard University; University of California System; University of California San Diego
摘要：We analyze the extent to which efficient trade is possible in an ongoing relationship between impatient agents with hidden valuations (i.i.d. over time), restricting attention to equilibria that satisfy ex post incentive constraints in each period. With ex ante budget balance, efficient trade can be supported in each period if the discount factor is at least one half. In contrast, when the budget must balance ex post, efficiency is not attainable, and furthermore for a wide range of probabilit...
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作者：Chung, Kim-Sau; Olszewski, Wojciech
作者单位：University of Minnesota System; University of Minnesota Twin Cities; University of Hong Kong; Northwestern University
摘要：We give a sufficient condition on the type space for revenue equivalence when the set of social alternatives consists of probability distributions over a finite set. Types are identified with real-valued functions that assign valuations to elements of this finite set, and the type space is equipped with the Euclidean topology. Our sufficient condition is stronger than connectedness but weaker than smooth arcwise connectedness. Our result generalizes all existing revenue equivalence theorems wh...
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作者：Dekel, Eddie; Fudenberg, Drew; Morris, Stephen
作者单位：Northwestern University; Tel Aviv University; Harvard University; Princeton University
摘要：This paper proposes the solution concept of interim correlated rationalizability, and shows that all types that have the same hierarchies of beliefs have the same set of interim-correlated-rationalizable outcomes. This solution concept characterizes common certainty of rationality in the universal type space.
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作者：Chamley, Christophe
作者单位：Universite PSL; Ecole Normale Superieure (ENS); Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales (EHESS); Institut Polytechnique de Paris; Ecole des Ponts ParisTech; Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); Boston University
摘要：In a financial market where agents trade for short-term profit and where news can increase the uncertainty of the public belief, there are strategic complementarities in the acquisition of private information and, if the cost of information is sufficiently small, a continuum of equilibrium strategies. Imperfect observation of past prices reduces the continuum of Nash equilibria to a Strongly Rational-Expectations Equilibrium. In that equilibrium, there are two sharply different regimes for the...
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作者：Epstein, Larry G.; Marinacci, Massimo; Seo, Kyoungwon
作者单位：Boston University; Collegio Carlo Alberto; University of Turin; University of Rochester
摘要：The paper considers an agent who must choose an action today under uncertainty about the consequence of any chosen action but without having in mind a complete list of all the contingencies that could influence outcomes. She conceives of some relevant (subjective) contingencies but she is aware that these contingencies are coarse-they leave out some details that may affect outcomes. Though she may not be able to describe these finer details, she is aware that they exist and this may affect her...
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作者：Xu, Boli
作者单位：University of Iowa
摘要：We study dynamic partnerships where the output evolves stochastically, each player can exit at any time, and players who have exited continue to accrue some benefits if the remaining players keep contributing to the partnership. Players can strategically exit to free-ride on their partners' contributions, knowing that it may trigger subsequent exits of their partners. We characterize the unique Pareto-optimal equilibrium. When players have sufficiently large free-riding incentives and a medium...
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作者：Laiho, Tuomas; Murto, Pauli; Salmi, Julia
作者单位：Aalto University; Hanken School of Economics
摘要：We introduce a collective experimentation problem where a continuum of agents choose the timing of irreversible actions under uncertainty and where public feedback from the actions arrives gradually over time. The leading application is the adoption of new technologies. The socially optimal expansion path entails an informational trade-off where acting today speeds up learning but postponing capitalizes on the option value of waiting. We contrast the social optimum to the decentralized equilib...
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作者：Grigoryan, Aram
作者单位：University of California System; University of California San Diego
摘要：The continuum matching model has been instrumental in the studies of finite economies. Yet, there is limited theoretical justification on whether and when a continuum model approximates large finite problems. In this paper, I study the following question: if we randomly sample finite economies from some distribution, will the stable assignments of these finite economies converge to a stable assignment of the continuum economy as we increase the sample size? I provide a simple condition, which ...
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作者：Gonczarowski, Yannai A.; Kominers, Scott Duke; Shorrer, Ran I.
作者单位：Harvard University; Harvard University; Harvard University; Harvard University; Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); Pennsylvania State University; Pennsylvania State University - University Park
摘要：Many economic models incorporate finiteness assumptions that, while introduced for simplicity, play a real role in the analysis. We provide a principled framework for scaling results from such models by removing these finiteness assumptions. Our sufficient conditions are on the theorem statement only, and not on its proof. This results in short proofs, and even allows us to use the same argument to scale similar theorems that were proven using distinctly different tools. We demonstrate the ver...
