-
作者：Goldlucke, Susanne; Troger, Thomas
作者单位：University of Konstanz; University of Mannheim
摘要：We present a class of simple transfer-free rules for assigning an unpleasant task among a group of agents: agents decide simultaneously whether or not to volunteer; if the number of volunteers exceeds a threshold number, the task is assigned to a volunteer; otherwise, the task is assigned to a non-volunteer. In particular, the rule may ask for multiple volunteers although one agent is sufficient to perform the task. In a setting in which agents care about who performs the task, any multiple-vo...
-
作者：Karp, Larry; Schmidt, Robert C.; Simon, Leo; Streekstra, Leanne
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Berkeley; Fern University Hagen
摘要：We introduce a novel continuous-time framework for analyzing two-player games. Each player can move at most once, choosing an action along with its timing. We introduce assumptions that allow for a natural representation of such games, and establish results on the relation between discrete and continuous time. Unlike in Simon and Stinchcombe (1989), action sets are compact subsets of Rn (rather than finite). This substantially increases the scope for applications. For illustration, we analyze ...
-
作者：Jungbauer, Thomas; Waldman, Michael
作者单位：Cornell University
摘要：For many signaling applications, the real-world scenario fails to match the model setup. Actions are often unobservable but combine with the sender's type to determine an observable signal. Introducing a theory of generalized signaling, we show the nature of equilibria can fundamentally differ from the canonical signaling model. In fact, we find both over-and under-investment arise in important signaling environments. Our model extends to multiple actions and signal jamming environments with i...
-
作者：Kreutzkamp, Sophie; Lou, Yichuan
作者单位：University of Manchester; University of Tokyo
摘要：We study a persuasion model with limited commitment in which the sender can commit to a signal ex ante but not to truthful reporting ex post. Sender-optimal signals exploit a key trade-off: although better-quality information allows the sender to communicate more precisely, it adversely affects the credibility of his messages. Building on this observation, we provide sufficient and necessary conditions for the sender to strictly benefit from obtaining an imperfect signal. Under linear preferen...
-
作者：Xu, Zhihao; Yu, Changhua
作者单位：Emory University; Peking University
摘要：This paper studies optimal monetary policy in a multisector economy with input-output linkages and distortions. Our model incorporates both the supply side and the demand side effects of monetary policy. We derive a tractable sufficient statistic for the supply side effect, which comprises two reallocation channels resulting from substitution between sectoral products for households and firms, and substitution between labor and intermediate inputs in production. The optimal monetary policy ind...
-
作者：Bourgeon, Jean-Marc; Picard, Pierre
作者单位：Institut Polytechnique de Paris; Ecole Polytechnique; ENSAE Paris
摘要：We study the interaction between self-insurance and market insurance when accident losses are multivalued. We show that self-insurance and market insurance may be complementary when self-insurance expenses do not affect much the probability distribution of large losses and the loading factor is high. This contrasts sharply with the conclusion of Ehrlich and Becker (1972) who establish the substitutability between self-insurance and market insurance when the cost of an accident is single-valued.
-
作者：Dilme, Francesc
作者单位：University of Bonn
摘要：This paper introduces and examines limit-of-all-finite (LOAF) equilibria, defined as strategy profiles obtained as limits of epsilon-equilibria along all discretizations of an infinite game. We establish conditions under which any limit of epsilon-equilibria along one discretization is a LOAF equilibrium, and we show that these conditions are satisfied in many common infinite games, such as Bertrand competition, wars of attrition, and standard auctions. We also identify conditions that ensure ...
-
作者：Bervoets, Sebastian; Makihara, Kohmei
作者单位：Aix-Marseille Universite; Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)
摘要：We consider public goods games with heterogeneous players interacting on a network and investigate how shocks to players' characteristics and changes in interaction patterns influence individual and total contributions. We introduce a linear system associated to the initial game, in which heterogeneity in players' characteristics is removed and interactions between players are reversed, and show that what matters in determining the effects of a shock on contributions is the sign of the coordin...
-
作者：Cheung, Paul H. Y.
作者单位：University of Texas System; University of Texas Dallas
摘要：We propose and characterize the General Reciprocity Model in a framework of context-dependent choice. In the model, the second mover can establish their own rules regarding when or why to reciprocate. The model disentangles the baseline social preference from reciprocity: reciprocity occurs when people deviate from their baseline preference due to the context in which the first mover's choice is made. Our model provides a condition to reveal reciprocity, which aligns with the standard model-fr...
-
作者：Zhou, Yu; Serizawa, Shigehiro
作者单位：Southern University of Science & Technology; Nagoya University; University of Osaka
摘要：We study an assignment market where multiple heterogeneous objects are sold to unit-demand agents who have general preferences that account for income effects and market frictions. The minimum price equilibrium (MPE) is one of the most important equilibrium concepts in such settings, as it demonstrates the possibility of designing efficient and strategy-proof mechanisms. Nevertheless, none of the well-known auction mechanisms that find the MPE in quasilinear settings can identify or even appro...
