Limit-of-All-Finite equilibria in infinite normal-form games

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Dilme, Francesc
• 署名单位: University of Bonn
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2026.106161
• 发表日期: 2026
• 关键词: Nash equilibrium; EXISTENCE; compact

摘要

This paper introduces and examines limit-of-all-finite (LOAF) equilibria, defined as strategy profiles obtained as limits of epsilon-equilibria along all discretizations of an infinite game. We establish conditions under which any limit of epsilon-equilibria along one discretization is a LOAF equilibrium, and we show that these conditions are satisfied in many common infinite games, such as Bertrand competition, wars of attrition, and standard auctions. We also identify conditions that ensure that the sets of LOAF and Nash equilibria coincide, and we discuss how our findings relate to known results on limit-of-finite perfect equilibria, approximate equilibria, and solutions for sharing rules.