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作者：Goto, Hiroshi; Ma, Yan; Takeuchi, Nobuyuki
作者单位：Chiba University; Kobe University; University of Marketing & Distribution Sciences
摘要：We develop a two-sector model to explore how skill distribution affects trade in final goods and offshoring. We show that when countries differ in skill abundance, wage disparities create opportunities for offshoring. In contrast, when countries vary in skill diversity but share the same median skill, symmetric skill distributions render offshoring infeasible. We also find that offshoring can result in the relative price under offshoring being lower than each country's autarky relative price i...
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作者：Pavan, Alessandro
作者单位：Northwestern University; Northwestern University
摘要：I consider a class of strategic interactions under asymmetric information in which, prior to finalizing their actions (consumption, production, or investment decisions), agents choose the attention to allocate to a large number of information sources about exogenous events that are responsible for their payoffs (the underlying fundamentals). I study what type of payoff interdependencies contribute to inefficiency in the allocation of attention. I then compare the results for the benchmark of p...
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作者：Billot, Antoine; Qu, Xiangyu
作者单位：Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); Wuhan University of Technology
摘要：We study social intertemporal preferences constructed through the aggregation of individual preferences that differ in both time discounting and instantaneous utility. We introduce weakened forms of the Pareto condition under which the social discount and instantaneous utility functions are weighted averages of their individual counterparts. We show that if individuals are time-consistent, then society can only preserve this property without falling into dictatorship by applying the condition ...
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作者：Sadler, Evan
摘要：Despite addressing similar underlying questions, the literatures on network formation and matching have evolved more or less independently. This paper offers a common framework, studying a general model of network formation without externalities-equivalently, a one-sided many-to-many matching model. I give conditions for the existence and uniqueness of stable graphs, I prove a rural hospital theorem, and I highlight a link-by-link conflict of interest across different stable graphs. Special ca...
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作者：Chen, Heng; Liu, Yicheng
作者单位：University of Hong Kong; University of International Business & Economics
摘要：In this paper, we characterize a forecasting model where forecasters cannot perfectly distinguish between the two persistent components (trends and cycles) in a dynamic setting. In this model, forecasters jointly update their beliefs about the two components: noisy information about one component is used to update beliefs about the other component. We present diagnostic empirical facts on forecasting behaviors and show that these facts are consistent with our model's predictions while contradi...
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作者：Shishkin, Denis
作者单位：University of California San Diego; University of California System; University of California San Diego
摘要：A sender seeks hard evidence to persuade a receiver to accept a project by designing a quality test. Testing is imperfectly reliable and produces evidence only with some probability. If the sender obtains the evidence, she can choose to disclose it or pretend not to have obtained it. When reliability is low, in equilibrium the sender chooses a pass/fail test that reveals only whether the quality is above or below a threshold. The pass/fail threshold is decreasing in reliability. If the sender ...
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作者：Brown, Alexander L.; Guo, Huiyi; Je, Hyundam
作者单位：Texas A&M University System; Texas A&M University College Station; University of Seoul
摘要：Generalized recursive utility models often imply that agents have a preference over the timing of uncertainty resolution. Laboratory elicitations of subjects' preferences generally provide direct evidence in support of this implication, but only in the domain of risk. We provide the first experimental examination of uncertainty resolution with respect to ambiguity, in addition to risk. The modal subject exhibits a preference for both early resolution of risk and ambiguity, but with only a mini...
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作者：Lyu, Chen
作者单位：Peking University Shenzhen Graduate School (PKU Shenzhen); Peking University
摘要：A recommendation platform sequentially collects information about a new product revealed from past consumer trials, and uses it to better guide later consumers. Because consumers do not internalize the value of information they bring to others, their incentive for trying out the product can be socially insufficient. Given such a challenge, I study how the platform can improve social welfare by designing its recommendation policy. In a model with binary product quality and general trial-generat...
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作者：Hancart, Nathan
作者单位：University of Oslo
摘要：I consider a model of monopoly pricing where a firm makes a price offer to a buyer with reference-dependent preferences without being able to commit to it. The reference point is the ex-ante probability of trade and the buyer exhibits an attachment effect: the higher his expectations to buy, the higher his willingness-to-pay. When the buyer's valuation is private information, a unique equilibrium exists where the firm plays a mixed strategy and its profits are the same as in the reference-inde...
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作者：Titova, Maria; Zhang, Kun
作者单位：Vanderbilt University; Vanderbilt University; University of Queensland
摘要：This paper studies a game in which an informed sender with state-independent preferences uses verifiable messages to convince a receiver to choose an action from a finite set. We characterize the equilibrium outcomes of the game and compare them with commitment outcomes in information design. We provide conditions under which a commitment outcome is an equilibrium outcome and identify environments in which the sender does not benefit from commitment power. Our findings offer insights into the ...
