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作者：Payro, Fernando
作者单位：Autonomous University of Barcelona; Barcelona School of Economics
摘要：This paper develops axiomatic models of preference under uncertainty and preference for commitment that satisfy Mixture-Betweenness, a weakening of the Independence axiom originally proposed by Chew (1989) and Dekel (1986). A central contribution of the paper is a general representation theorem that can be applied across a wide range of domains.
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作者：Balzer, Benjamin; Rosato, Antonio
作者单位：University of Technology Sydney; University of Queensland; University of Naples Federico II
摘要：We analyze reserve prices in auctions with independent private values when bidders are expectations-based loss averse. We find that the optimal public reserve price excludes fewer bidder types than under risk neutrality. Moreover, we show that public reserve prices are not optimal as the seller can earn a higher revenue with mechanisms that better leverage the attachment effect. We discuss two such mechanisms: i) an auction with a secret and random reserve price, and ii) a mechanism where an a...
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作者：Lu, Zhuoran; Song, Yangbo
作者单位：Shanghai Jiao Tong University; The Chinese University of Hong Kong, Shenzhen
摘要：We study a team incentive design problem where multiple agents are located on a network and work on a joint project. The principal seeks the least costly mechanism to incentivize full effort, by choosing the work assignment sequence and the rewards to the agents upon success. Whereas the agents' actions are hidden to the principal, they may be observed among the agents given the internal information that is determined by the network and the sequence. Under effort complementarity, the transpare...
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作者：Mcclellan, Andrew
作者单位：University of Chicago
摘要：We study how a principal decides the duration of a project based on an agent's report about the growth rate of the project's profitability. The principal optimally commits to a project standard, shutting down whenever the project's profitability falls below the standard. Low-growth projects receive stationary standards, whereas high-growth projects receive standards that either increase unboundedly over time (with growing inefficiencies upon shut down), decrease towards the principal's first-b...
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作者：Hafalir, Isa; Kesten, Onur; Sherstyuk, Katerina; Tao, Cong
作者单位：University of Technology Sydney; University of Sydney; University of Hawaii System; University of Hawaii Manoa; Zhejiang University of Finance & Economics
摘要：We study a remarkable auction used in several fish markets around the world, notably in Honolulu and Sydney, whereby high-quality fish are sold fast through a hybrid auction that combines the Dutch and the English formats in one auction. Speedy sales are of essence for these perishable goods. Our theoretical model incorporating time costs demonstrates that such Honolulu-Sydney auction is preferred by the auctioneer over the Dutch auction when there are few bidders or when bidders have high tim...
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作者：Ichihashi, Shota
作者单位：Queens University - Canada
摘要：Agents decide whether to commit a crime based on their private types, which capture their heterogeneous returns from a crime. The police have information about these types. The police search agents, without commitment, to detect crime subject to a search capacity constraint. The deterrent effect of policing is lost when the police have full information about agents' types. The crime-minimizing information structure prevents the police from identifying agents who face high returns from a crime,...
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作者：Guo, Yingni; Hao, Li; Shi, Xianwen
作者单位：University of British Columbia
摘要：A seller of an indivisible good designs a selling mechanism for a buyer whose private information (his type) is the distribution of his value for the good. A selling mechanism includes both a menu of sequential pricing, and a menu of information disclosure about the realized value that the buyer is allowed to learn privately. In a model of two types with an increasing likelihood ratio, we show that under some regularity conditions the disclosure policy in an optimal mechanism has a nested inte...
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作者：Bommier, Antoine; Fabre, Adrien; Goussebaile, Arnaud; Heyen, Daniel
作者单位：Swiss Federal Institutes of Technology Domain; ETH Zurich; Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); Universite Paris Saclay; Institut Polytechnique de Paris; AgroParisTech; Ecole Nationale des Ponts et Chaussees; Universite Paris Saclay; AgroParisTech; Institut Polytechnique de Paris; Ecole Nationale des Ponts et Chaussees; RPTU University Kaiserslautern
摘要：Experts often disagree. A decision-maker may want to be cautious and prefer alternatives that have expert consensus over those that do not. Existing models of decision making under expert disagreement rest on ambiguity-averse preferences adopting a unanimity principle: If all experts consider one choice better than another, so should the decision-maker. Such unanimity among experts, however, can be spurious, masking substantial disagreement on the underlying reasons. We introduce a novel notio...
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作者：Ou, Shengliang; Yin, Penghui; Zhang, Donghai; Zhang, Renbin
作者单位：Shanghai Jiao Tong University; Central University of Finance & Economics; National University of Singapore; Shandong University
摘要：Optimal monetary policy has traditionally assigned greater importance to stabilizing prices in sectors with stickier prices, based on multi-sector models assuming full information or exogenous information frictions. This paper challenges the prevailing policy prescription by introducing rational inattention with endogenous information acquisition. Interestingly, the optimal policy assigns a smaller weight to sectors with stickier prices when the cost of information acquisition is sufficiently ...
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作者：Figueroa, Nicolas; Inostroza, Nicolas
作者单位：Pontificia Universidad Catolica de Chile; University of Toronto
摘要：A liquidity-constrained asset owner screens an informed investor using financial securities. Information-insensitive securities reduce the investor's information rents. The optimal screening mechanism consists of a monotone debt menu where more optimistic investor types purchase larger amounts of debt. Interestingly, the issuer may benefit from trading with a better informed investor. For any monotone debt menu, as the asset's cash flows more accurately describe the investor's private informat...
