Actions and signals

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Jungbauer, Thomas; Waldman, Michael
• 署名单位: Cornell University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2025.106100
• 发表日期: 2025
• 关键词: school; university; selection; earnings; college; games

摘要

For many signaling applications, the real-world scenario fails to match the model setup. Actions are often unobservable but combine with the sender's type to determine an observable signal. Introducing a theory of generalized signaling, we show the nature of equilibria can fundamentally differ from the canonical signaling model. In fact, we find both over-and under-investment arise in important signaling environments. Our model extends to multiple actions and signal jamming environments with incomplete sender information. We present results for equilibrium construction and show that uninformed sender behavior may be more efficient than a fully informed sender's.