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作者：Azrieli, Yaron
作者单位：University System of Ohio; Ohio State University
摘要：Consider a population of agents who repeatedly compete for awards, as in the case of researchers annually applying for grants. Noise in the selection process may encourage entry of low-quality proposals, forcing the principal to commit large resources to reviewing applications and further increasing award misallocation. A temporary exclusion policy prohibits an agent from applying in the current period if they received a low evaluation in the previous. We study the steadystate equilibria under...
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作者：Marinacci, Massimo; Principi, Giulio; Stanca, Lorenzo
作者单位：Bocconi University; Bocconi University; New York University; University of Turin; University of Turin
摘要：Monotonicity and recursivity are central assumptions in intertemporal consumption problems under ambiguity. We show that monotone recursive preferences admit both a recursive and an ex-ante representation, and that the certainty equivalent functionals associated with these representations are translation invariant. Translation invariance implies that the decision maker's ambiguity attitudes are constant, in the sense that they do not vary with the level of welfare or utility. Finally, we estab...
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作者：Mishra, Debasis; Patil, Sanket
作者单位：Indian Statistical Institute; Indian Statistical Institute Delhi; Indian Institute of Management (IIM System); Indian Institute of Management Bangalore
摘要：We study undominated mechanisms with transfers for regulating a monopolist who privately observes the marginal cost of production. A mechanism is undominated if no other mechanism gives the regulator a strictly higher payoff at some marginal cost of the monopolist without lowering the regulator's payoff at other costs. We show that an undominated mechanism has a quantity floor: whenever the monopolist is allowed to operate, it produces above a threshold quantity. Moreover, the regulator's oper...
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作者：Abad, Nicolas; Etner, Johanna; Raffin, Natacha; Seegmuller, Thomas
作者单位：Universite de Rouen Normandie; Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); Universite Paris Saclay; Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); Aix-Marseille Universite
摘要：We use an overlapping generations model with physical and human capital, and two reproductive periods to explore how fertility decisions may differ in response to economic incentives in early and late adulthood. In particular, we analyze the interplay between fertility choices-related to career opportunities-and wages, and investigate the role played by work experience and investment in both types of capital. We show that young adults postpone parenthood above a certain wage threshold and that...
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作者：Dube, Jean-Pierre; Joo, Joonhwi; Kim, Kyeongbae
作者单位：University of Chicago; National Bureau of Economic Research; University of Texas Dallas; University of Texas System; University of Texas Dallas; Sejong University
摘要：We establish the integrability of demand for a broad class of discrete/continuous choice, additive, homothetic random-utility models of individual consumer behavior with perfect substitutes preferences (linear indifference curves) and divisible goods. We derive the corresponding indirect utility function and then establish a representative consumer formulation for this entire class of models. The representative consumer is always normative, facilitating aggregate welfare analysis. These findin...
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作者：Kasberger, Bernhard; Woodward, Kyle
作者单位：University of Konstanz
摘要：Multi-unit auctions frequently take place in environments with limited information, such as in new markets and under volatile macroeconomic conditions. We characterize optimal prior-free bids in such auctions; these bids minimize the maximal loss in expected utility resulting from uncertainty surrounding opponent behavior. We show that optimal bids are readily computable in this environment despite bidders having multi-dimensional private information. In the pay-as-bid auction the prior-free b...
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作者：Kornbluth, Daniel; Kushnir, Alexey; Nguyen, Thanh; Vohra, Rakesh
作者单位：Harvard University; Mohammed VI Polytechnic University; Purdue University System; Purdue University; University of Pennsylvania; University of Pennsylvania
摘要：Nguyen et al. (2016) introduce the Bundled Probabilistic Serial and Bundled Probabilistic Serial under Limited Complementarities mechanisms for allocating bundles of indivisible objects under ordinal preferences over bundles. They present efficiency, fairness, and incentive properties of the two mechanisms, showing both to be ordinally efficient, weakly envy-free, weakly strategy-proof, and asymptotically strategy-proof. We provide counterexamples demonstrating that the Bundled Probabilistic S...
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作者：Iijima, Ryota; Oyama, Daisuke
作者单位：Princeton University
摘要：We study how the equilibrium dynamics of a continuum-population game approximate those of large finite-population games. New agents stochastically arrive to replace exiting ones and make irreversible action choices to maximize the expected discounted lifetime payoffs. The key assumption is that they only observe imperfect signals about the action distribution in the population. We first show that the stochastic process of the action distribution in the finite-population game is approximated by...
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作者：Martins-da-Rocha, V. Filipe; Phan, Toan; Vailakis, Yiannis
作者单位：Getulio Vargas Foundation; Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); Laboratoire dEconomie de Dauphine LEDa; Institut de Recherche pour le Developpement (IRD); Laboratoire dEconomie de Dauphine LEDa; Universite PSL; Universite Paris-Dauphine; Laboratoire dEconomie de Dauphine LEDa; Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - Richmond; University of Glasgow
摘要：We show that a temporary tightening of unsecured credit limits can raise welfare in competitive economies with limited commitment. When default excludes agents from borrowing but not saving, the value of default becomes price-dependent. Because agents do not internalize the effects of borrowing limits on equilibrium prices and participation constraints, laissez-faire limits need not be welfare-maximizing. A pre-announced, transitory tightening raises bond prices (lowers interest rates), reduce...
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作者：Giebe, Thomas; Gurtler, Oliver
作者单位：Linnaeus University; University of Cologne
摘要：In competitive settings, disparities in player strength are common. It is intuitively unclear whether a stronger player would opt for larger or smaller effort compared to weaker players. Larger effort could leverage their strength, while lower effort might be justified by their higher probability of winning regardless of effort. We analyze multi-prize contests with three or more heterogeneous players, exploring when stronger players exert larger or lower effort. To rank efforts, it suffices to...
