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作者：Canidio, Andrea
摘要：I study a repeated auction in which payments are made with a blockchain token created and initially owned by the auction designer. Unlike the virtual money previously examined in mechanism design, such tokens can be saved and traded outside the mechanism. I show that the present-discounted value of expected revenues equals that of a conventional dollar auction, but revenues accrue earlier and are less volatile. The optimal monetary policy burns the tokens used for payment, a practice common in...
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作者：Baughman, Garth
作者单位：Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve System Board of Governors
摘要：Deadlines and fixed end dates are pervasive in matching markets. Deadlines drive fundamental non-stationarity and complexity in behavior, generating significant departures from the steadystate equilibria usually studied in the search and matching literature. I consider a two-sided matching market with search frictions where vertically differentiated agents attempt to form bilateral matches before a deadline. I give novel proofs of existence and uniqueness of equilibria, and show that all equil...
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作者：Lu, Zhuoran
作者单位：Shanghai Jiao Tong University
摘要：This paper studies a signaling model in which a strategic player can manipulate the cost of signaling. A seller chooses a price scheme for a good, and a buyer with a hidden type chooses how much to purchase as a signal to receivers. When receivers observe the price scheme, the seller charges monopoly prices, and the buyer purchases less than the first best. In contrast, when receivers do not observe the price scheme, the demand for signals is more elastic. In equilibrium, the seller charges lo...
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作者：Smith, Eric
作者单位：University of Essex
摘要：This paper assesses wage setting and wage dynamics in a search and matching framework where (i) workers and firms on occasion can meet multilaterally; (ii) workers can recall previous encounters with firms; and (iii) firms cannot commit to future wages and workers cannot commit to not searching in the future. The resulting progression of wages (from firms paying just enough to keep their workers) yields a compensation structure consistent with well established but difficult to reconcile observ...
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作者：Bahlali, M.; Boucekkine, R.; Petit, Q.
作者单位：Aix-Marseille Universite; Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)
摘要：We propose a mean-field game (MFG) approach to study the dynamics of spatial agglomeration in a continuous space-time framework where trade across locations may follow a broad class of static gravity models. Forward-looking intertemporal utility-maximizing agents work and migrate in a two-dimensional geography and face idiosyncratic shocks. Equilibrium wages and prices depend on their common distribution and adjust statically according to the underlying trade model. We first prove existence an...
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作者：Isch-Taudien, Remo; Schneider, Fabienne
作者单位：Study Center Gerzensee; University of Bern; Bank of Canada
摘要：We study pseudonymity-an information regime where agents' histories are perfectly observable, but linked only to pseudonyms rather than to true identities. A key feature is that agents may open and use multiple pseudonyms simultaneously. In a tractable environment with limited commitment, we characterize the set of stationary credit equilibria under pseudonymity, showing that it forms a strict non-empty subset of equilibria attainable under a no anonymity regime, where histories are publicly l...
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作者：Chang, Dongkyu; Kim, Duk Gyoo; Lim, Wooyoung
作者单位：City University of Hong Kong; Yonsei University; Hong Kong University of Science & Technology
摘要：In the standard dynamic screening problem between an uninformed seller and a privately informed buyer, theory suggests that the presence (absence) of the buyer's outside option leads to a substantial surplus for the seller (buyer). This outcome arises from contrasting unraveling processes that theory predicts: negative selection occurs in the absence of an outside option, while positive selection occurs in the presence of it. We examine the validity of these contrasting unraveling processes an...
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作者：Carreras, Marc Dordal i; Lee, Seung Joo
作者单位：Hong Kong University of Science & Technology; University of Oxford
摘要：This paper develops a model of business cycles with endogenous volatility at the zero lower bound (ZLB) and central-bank forward guidance. We deliver three main results. First, a credible commitment to future stabilization curbs excess volatility at the ZLB. Second, pledging not to stabilize later can shift the economy onto more favorable equilibrium paths, exposing a tradeoff between future stabilization and reduced aggregate volatility at the ZLB. Third, keeping the timing of future stabiliz...
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作者：Chowdhury, Prabal Roy; Sengupta, Kunal
作者单位：Indian Statistical Institute; Indian Statistical Institute Delhi; University of Sydney
摘要：The hold-up problem has given rise to a large and influential literature. We consider a bilateral hold-up problem where bargaining power is asymmetrically distributed among the agents, in particular investing at the efficient level is not individually rational for one of the agents. We demonstrate that in the presence of a rich natural setup-that allows for dynamics in transfers, investments and negotiations-there exist subgame perfect equilibria that achieve asymptotic efficiency. This is tru...
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作者：Kirneva, Margarita; Nunez, Matias
作者单位：CUNEF Universidad; Institut Polytechnique de Paris; Ecole Polytechnique; ENSAE Paris; Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); Institut Polytechnique de Paris; Ecole Polytechnique
摘要：All currently known mechanisms that fully implement Majority rule are either infinite (integer games) or rely on off-equilibrium transfers. We propose a finite mechanism with no transfers, called Bloc formation, that achieves this goal in pure and mixed strategies. It increases the set of instances where any agent is pivotal by relying on off-equilibrium lotteries, and thus, incentivizes truth-telling.
