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作者：Sockin, Michael
作者单位：University of Texas System; University of Texas Austin
摘要：A key function of financial intermediaries is to borrow in financial markets and lend to firms. I show that this creates informational linkages between repo and corporate bond markets. My key result is improving transparency in either market may lower welfare even if funding liquidity improves. My model's predictions are consistent with the bond and repo market dysfunction during the 2008 global financial and COVID-19 crises, and the impact of the introduction of TRACE on bond markets in 2002....
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作者：Dziewulski, Pawel
作者单位：University of Sussex
摘要：We develop a revealed preference method for studying preferences of individuals whose choices may be inconsistent with utility maximisation. We show that acyclicity of the strict revealed preference is necessary and sufficient for the data to be rationalisable with approximate utility maximisation. In this model, an alternative is selected from a menu only if its utility is not significantly lower than that of any other available option. This allows us to test for consumer behaviour that is su...
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作者：Yildirim, Huseyin
作者单位：Duke University
摘要：This paper examines incentives in teams of career-concerned members, where effort and talent can be substitutes (Holmstr & ouml;m, 1999) or complements (Dewatripont et al., 1999). It is shown that the degree of effort-talent complementarity determines which team member exerts more effort and thus gains or loses more reputation following team performance. The paper argues that organizations can boost incentives by promoting concern for collective reputation. Strategies to achieve this include f...
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作者：Hafalir, Isa E.; Kojima, Fuhito; Yenmez, M. Bumin
作者单位：University of Technology Sydney; University of Tokyo; Washington University (WUSTL); Durham University
摘要：Given an initial matching and a policy objective on the distribution of agent types to institutions, we study the existence of a mechanism that weakly improves the distributional objective and satisfies constrained efficiency, individual rationality, and strategy-proofness. Such a mechanism need not exist in general. We introduce a new notion of discrete concavity, which we call pseudo M#-concavity, and construct a mechanism with the desirable properties when the distributional objective satis...
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作者：Albrecht, Brian C.; Phelan, Thomas; Pretnar, Nick
作者单位：Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - Cleveland; University of California System; University of California Santa Barbara
摘要：We enrich standard models of imperfect competition by allowing consumer demand for market goods to depend non-separably on off-market time. Consumers value final consumption experiences that require both market purchases and time, which reshapes demand elasticities through two opposing forces. First, because time is an input, changes in market prices translate only partially into changes in the cost of an experience and second, households can substitute time for market purchases in response to...
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作者：Healy, Paul J.; Leo, Greg
作者单位：University System of Ohio; Ohio State University; Loyola Marymount University
摘要：Given a model of preferences, what choice data or experiment is sufficient to definitively test whether a subject is consistent with the model or to classify them into some type within the model? We characterize all experiments that test or classify a given model using a novel graph-theoretic construction: the labeled permutohedron. We show how these results can be used to identify the smallest experiments that achieve a particular goal.
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作者：Biswas, Sonny; Koufopoulos, Kostas; Nguyen, Thi Mai
作者单位：University of Reading; University of Sussex; University of York - UK
摘要：We reconsider the incomplete contracting framework of Mitkov (2024) in which an entrepreneur seeks funding for a project and can privately choose its type. Renegotiation is permitted at an intermediate date. We characterize the conditions under which pay-for-failure is necessary to incentivize the entrepreneur to undertake the value-maximizing innovative project. When pay-for-failure is necessary, we generalize Mitkov (2024)'s results by showing that callable long-term debt can replicate the s...
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作者：Chang, Hung-Chi; Li, Yiting
作者单位：Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); Pennsylvania State University; Pennsylvania State University - University Park; National Taiwan University
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作者：Alon, Titan; Fershtman, Daniel
作者单位：University of California System; University of California San Diego; Emory University
摘要：This paper generalizes the canonical model of human capital accumulation through schooling to endogenize the process of academic specialization. It provides the solution to a class of dynamic investment problems with switching and stopping under sequential uncertainty. Under mild assumptions, the model's optimal policy has a particularly simple form that can be reduced to the comparison of independent indices. The optimal policy implies that schooling should begin with a period of general educ...
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作者：Li, Xuelin; Szydlowski, Martin; Yu, Fangyuan
作者单位：Hong Kong University of Science & Technology; Shanghai University of Finance & Economics
摘要：We study dynamic Bayesian persuasion in an entry game. A sender publicly reveals information to an adopter and a competitor who decide when to irreversibly enter or exit a market. When the sender's loss from competition is small, the sender first provides information to attract the adopter, and then aims to reveal sufficiently negative information to deter the competitor. Otherwise, the optimal policy is reversed. The sender first aims to provide negative information to deter the competitor an...
