-
作者：Yang, Lily Ling
作者单位：Universitat de les Illes Balears
摘要：We study a persuasion problem in which the receiver has the ability to probabilistically verify the state at a cost. The sender wants to convince the receiver to accept a project, but the receiver is only willing to accept the project when its quality is above a threshold. The optimal disclosure policy strikes a balance between influencing the receiver's decisions to accept and to verify the quality. It is deterministic and involves at most three messages, each consisting of an acceptance reco...
-
作者：Watson, Joel
作者单位：University of California San Diego; University of California System; University of California San Diego
摘要：This article identifies sufficient conditions under which a partial construction of sequential equilibrium-characterizing beliefs and behavior for only a subset of the information sets-is sufficient for the existence of a sequential equilibrium that coincides with the partial construction in a suitable way. Illustrative applications are also presented.
-
作者：Barbieri, Stefano; Topolyan, Iryna
作者单位：Tulane University; University System of Ohio; University of Cincinnati
摘要：We consider group all-pay auctions with a wide range of effort complementarity in which teammates coordinate efforts via a group-specific correlation device. Under mild regularity conditions, there is a unique equilibrium effort distribution, independent of the distribution correlation device. We characterize this unique distribution of efforts and analyze the effects value dispersion, degree of complementarity, and group size. We show that this effort distribution can be achieved without corr...
-
作者：Azarmsa, Ehsan
作者单位：University of Illinois System; University of Illinois Chicago; University of Illinois Chicago Hospital
摘要：I study the stationary wealth distribution in a dynamic model of financial markets in which investors differ in their levels of investment sophistication. Some investors form beliefs rationally but have access to different information, while others hold incorrect beliefs. For all investor types, the stationary wealth distribution exhibits a thick upper tail, whose thickness depends on the higher moments of portfolio returns relative to the aggregate market. The upper tail of the overall statio...
-
作者：Yueshen, Bart Zhou; Zou, Junyuan
作者单位：Singapore Management University; INSEAD Business School
摘要：We show in a model of RFQ trading that customers may admit only a few dealers, even when more are available, to induce maximum liquidity supply-less can be more. The number of admitted dealers is pinned down by a competition elasticity, shaped by dealers' cost to respond to RFQs. For example, higher search (operating) costs increase (reduce) admitted dealers. A social planner would mandate even fewer dealers than the market outcome, because customers induce excessive dealer competition. The mo...
-
作者：Escude, Matteo
作者单位：Luiss Guido Carli University
摘要：I study a model of information acquisition and transmission in which the sender's ability to misreport her findings is limited. The sender learns covertly, so a key observation is that in equilibrium she must be deterred from undetectably worsening the meaning of the messages she sends. This force substantially disciplines equilibrium beliefs and behavior: the receiver is maximally skeptical of what the sender claims and learns all discovered information. I exploit these equilibrium properties...
-
作者：Kim, Eungsik; Li, Jiayi
作者单位：University of Kansas
摘要：This paper investigates the implications of incorporating quasi-hyperbolic discounting preferences and extending the economic lifespan for the emergence of endogenous business cycles. Using a three-period overlapping generations model, we examine how quasi-hyperbolic discounting influences the dynamics of deterministic cycles and local sunspot equilibria. The presence of a middle-aged generation plays a key role in generating an elasticity of intertemporal substitution that is lower than the i...
-
作者：Meng, Dawen
作者单位：Shanghai University of Finance & Economics
摘要：This paper discusses a network game in a local-average setup, where players' payoffs depend on the social norms they confront. I focus on an optimal targeting intervention problem, where a planner aims to maximize social welfare by altering individual characteristics ex ante. First, I decompose orthogonally the optimal intervention into the eigenspaces of the social welfare matrix. In what follows, I present the limit forms of the optimal intervention as the budget approaches infinity or zero....
-
作者：Cho, In-Koo; Libgober, Jonathan
作者单位：Emory University; Hanyang University; University of Southern California
摘要：This paper examines learning dynamics under non-parametric model uncertainty. We choose the monopolistic profit maximization problem (Myerson (1981)) as our laboratory. We consider a monopolist who chooses a learning algorithm to select a price following a history, facing non-parametric model uncertainty about the probability distribution of the buyer's valuation and bearing the computational cost. We posit that the monopolist has a lexicographic preference over profit and computational comple...
-
作者：Sun, Xiang; Tang, Qianfeng; Xiao, Mingjun; Zhang, Jun
作者单位：Wuhan University; Shanghai University of Finance & Economics; Hubei University of Economics; Nanjing Audit University
摘要：Following Balbuzanov and Kotowski (2019), we study the exchange of indivisible objects among agents with unit demand, where initially each object is either privately owned or is co-owned by multiple agents. We propose a new notion of core called the effective core for these problems to address the inadequacies of conventional notions of core. We say that a coalition effectively blocks an assignment if it weakly blocks it-as in the definition of the strong core-and the blocking is credible in t...
