Minimum price equilibrium in the assignment market: Structural properties and the Serial Vickrey mechanism

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Zhou, Yu; Serizawa, Shigehiro
• 署名单位: Southern University of Science & Technology; Nagoya University; University of Osaka
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2026.106216
• 发表日期: 2026
• 关键词: Strategy-proofness; PLANNING-PROCEDURES; house allocation; Fair allocation; preferences; EFFICIENCY; auction

摘要

We study an assignment market where multiple heterogeneous objects are sold to unit-demand agents who have general preferences that account for income effects and market frictions. The minimum price equilibrium (MPE) is one of the most important equilibrium concepts in such settings, as it demonstrates the possibility of designing efficient and strategy-proof mechanisms. Nevertheless, none of the well-known auction mechanisms that find the MPE in quasilinear settings can identify or even approximate MPEs for general preferences. We establish novel structural properties of MPEs and use these properties as the foundation to design a Serial Vickrey (SV) mechanism. The SV mechanism finds an MPE for general preferences through a finite number of indifference prices reported by the agents, each of which represents their willingness to pay for a target object based on their tentatively assigned bundle. Furthermore, the SV mechanism also has desirable dynamic incentive properties.