作者：Aberg, Simon Essig; Baisa, Brian
作者单位：Harvard University; Amherst College
摘要：We study multi-unit auctions for homogeneous goods in a private-value setting where bidders have multi-unit demand and non-negative wealth effects. When bidders have quasilinear preferences, the Vickrey auction implements an efficient outcome in dominant strategies. When bidders have positive wealth effects, recent impossibility results find that no auction implements an efficient outcome. We quantify the worst-case inefficiency of the Vickrey auction and other multi-unit auctions when bidders...
作者：Koessler, Frederic; Pahlke, Marieke
作者单位：Hautes Etudes Commerciales (HEC) Paris; Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); Corvinus University Budapest
摘要：We use a notion of maxmin self-confirming equilibrium (MSCE) to study the design of players' information feedback about others' behavior in simultaneous-move games with ambiguity- averse players. Coarse feedback shapes strategic uncertainty and can, therefore, modify players' equilibrium strategies in an advantageous way. We characterize MSCE and study the equilibrium implications of coarse feedback in various classes of games. We show how feedback should be optimally designed to improve contr...
