On the timing of moves in two-player games

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Karp, Larry; Schmidt, Robert C.; Simon, Leo; Streekstra, Leanne
• 署名单位: University of California System; University of California Berkeley; Fern University Hagen
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2025.106107
• 发表日期: 2025
• 关键词: continuous-time; PRICE LEADERSHIP; INNOVATION; MODEL

摘要

We introduce a novel continuous-time framework for analyzing two-player games. Each player can move at most once, choosing an action along with its timing. We introduce assumptions that allow for a natural representation of such games, and establish results on the relation between discrete and continuous time. Unlike in Simon and Stinchcombe (1989), action sets are compact subsets of Rn (rather than finite). This substantially increases the scope for applications. For illustration, we analyze different variants of price competition with entry in continuous time. Our framework handles complexities such as discontinuous changes in prices, and allows us to predict the identity of the price leader with minimal calculation. We show that it depends on product differentiation and on the possibility to deter entry.