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作者：Ritzberger, Klaus; Weibull, Jorgen W.; Wikman, Peter
作者单位：University of London; Royal Holloway University London; Stockholm School of Economics; Communaute d'universites et etablissements de Toulouse (Comue); Universite Toulouse 1 Capitole; Toulouse School of Economics
摘要：A new solution concept for finite games is presented and analyzed. It is defined in terms of outcomes-probability distributions over the plays of the game. Solid outcomes are robust to the representation of the game, whether in normal or extensive form, and are consistent with backward induction. They are also unaffected by the removal or addition of dominated strategies. Solid outcome sets exist in all finite extensive-form games with perfect recall. They have support in minimal game blocks, ...
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作者：Sabarwal, Tarun
作者单位：University of Kansas
摘要：We provide a new and general theory of order nearest comparative statics for subsets of equilibria in models with complementarities used widely in economics and other disciplines. Order nearest equilibria are motivated naturally in the theory of monotone comparative statics of equilibrium, but their existence does not follow from results based on weak set order or strong set order, in general. We provide such results and develop the general theory using weak monotonicity of selections from bes...
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作者：Fiaschi, Davide; Ricci, Cristiano
作者单位：University of Pisa
摘要：This paper examines the spatial agglomeration of workers and income in a continuous spacetime framework. Local markets feature spatial spillovers and both exogenous and endogenous amenities. Workers relocate to maximise their instantaneous utility, constrained by mobility costs. In the limit of infinite workers, short-run equilibria are described by a partial differential equation (PDE). The PDE reveals spatial dynamics influenced by initial conditions, path dependence, and metastability (pers...
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作者：Meyer-Gohde, Alexander; Tzaawa-Krenzler, Mary
作者单位：Goethe University Frankfurt; University of Oxford
摘要：The Taylor principle, a more than one-for-one reaction of the nominal interest rate to inflation, is a central tenet of monetary policy to rule out self-fulfilling equilibria. The standard sticky-price model only holds this principle as a sufficient determinacy bound, with substitutes such as output-gap targeting available. We show that if the long-run Phillips curve is vertical, the Taylor principle is necessary and no amount of output-gap, output-growth, or forecast targeting can substitute ...
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作者：Chen, Enxian; Qiao, Lei; Sun, Xiang; Sun, Yeneng
作者单位：Nankai University; Shanghai University of Finance & Economics; Wuhan University; National University of Singapore; National University of Singapore
摘要：Perfect equilibrium and its refinements are widely studied and typically rely on full-support perturbations. We introduce a S-localized notion of perfection for games with a continuum of players. It confines perturbations within a S-neighborhood of the underlying action distribution and eliminates undesirable equilibria from a local perspective. We establish the existence of a pure strategy S-localized perfect equilibrium and show that it is equivalent to S-admissible Nash equilibrium. We also...
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作者：Gu, Chao; Wang, Lu; Wright, Randall
作者单位：University of Missouri System; University of Missouri Columbia; University of Western Australia; Zhejiang University; University of Wisconsin System; University of Wisconsin Madison
摘要：We study dynamics in frictional markets with intermediated trade, where middlemen can buy goods or assets from sellers, hold them as inventory, and sell when contacting appropriate buyers. Importantly, buyers have heterogeneous match-specific valuations, letting us characterize equilibrium in terms of reservation trading strategies (related papers with homogeneous valuations imply bang-bang solutions that are awkward for the economics and mathematics). Using bifurcation theory, we show there a...
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作者：Hiller, Timo
摘要：This paper studies optimal targeting policies, which consist of eliminating (preserving) a set of agents in a network and aim to minimize (maximize) aggregate effort levels. Unlike the existing literature, we allow the equilibrium network to adapt after a network intervention. We introduce a novel and tractable adjustment process. If global strategic substitution effects are sufficiently small, optimal targeting is characterized by a simple rule: eliminate a set of agents with the highest degr...
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作者：Imamura, Kenzo
作者单位：University of Tokyo
摘要：A college or firm makes admissions or hiring decisions for which each candidate is characterized by priority ranking and type, which might depend on race, gender, or socioeconomic status. The admissions or hiring committee faces a tradeoff between meritocracy and diversity: Although a merit-irst choice rule might admit candidates of the same type, a diversity-irst choice rule might be unfair because of priority violations. To formalize this tradeoff, we introduce a measure of meritocracy and a...
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作者：Strzalecki, Tomasz; Toikka, Juuso
作者单位：Harvard University; University of Pennsylvania
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作者：Pourbabaee, Farzad; Echenique, Federico
作者单位：California Institute of Technology; University of California System; University of California Berkeley
摘要：We study mechanism design for public-good provision under a noisy privacy-preserving transformation of individual agents' reported preferences. The setting is a standard binary model with transfers and quasi-linear utility. Agents report their preferences for the public good, which are randomly flipped, so that any individual report may be explained away as the outcome of noise. We study the tradeoffs between preserving the public decisions made in the presence of noise (noise sensitivity), pu...
