Credit, money and (pseudo-)anonymity

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Isch-Taudien, Remo; Schneider, Fabienne
• 署名单位: Study Center Gerzensee; University of Bern; Bank of Canada
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2026.106202
• 发表日期: 2026
• 关键词: Repeated games; equilibrium; RISK

摘要

We study pseudonymity-an information regime where agents' histories are perfectly observable, but linked only to pseudonyms rather than to true identities. A key feature is that agents may open and use multiple pseudonyms simultaneously. In a tractable environment with limited commitment, we characterize the set of stationary credit equilibria under pseudonymity, showing that it forms a strict non-empty subset of equilibria attainable under a no anonymity regime, where histories are publicly linked to true identities. Moreover, money is always essential under pseudonymity, yet cannot co-exist with credit. Finally, imposing optimal fees on pseudonym creation generally raises welfare, whereas making pseudonyms tradable never does.