Hold-up in the absence of individual rationality: Asymptotic efficiency and gradualism

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Chowdhury, Prabal Roy; Sengupta, Kunal
• 署名单位: Indian Statistical Institute; Indian Statistical Institute Delhi; University of Sydney
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2026.106209
• 发表日期: 2026
• 关键词: investment

摘要

The hold-up problem has given rise to a large and influential literature. We consider a bilateral hold-up problem where bargaining power is asymmetrically distributed among the agents, in particular investing at the efficient level is not individually rational for one of the agents. We demonstrate that in the presence of a rich natural setup-that allows for dynamics in transfers, investments and negotiations-there exist subgame perfect equilibria that achieve asymptotic efficiency. This is true both when investments by the two agents are substitutes, as well as when these are complements. Moreover, implementation requires gradualism, with sequential investments and transfers over several periods.